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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This appeal is taken by Defendant and Appellant ClearOne Communications, Inc.
("ClearOne") from afinaljudgment of the Third Judicial District Court. Thus, the Utah
Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Section 78A-3-102(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

ClearOne raises the following issues on appeal:
(a)

Does the perjury conviction of Plaintiff Susie Strohm ("Strohm") preclude
ClearOne from indemnifying Strohm because she did not act in good faith,
in the corporation's best interests, or in the reasonable belief that her
conduct was lawful, as required by Utah Code section 16-10a-902 and
ClearOne's bylaws?

(b)

Is Strohm entitled to mandatory indemnification under Utah Code section
16-10a-903 and -907 in light of ClearOne's bylaw requirements and
Strohm's conviction?

(c)

Does the scope of the engagement letter of Plaintiff and Appellee Dorsey &
Whitney, LLP ("Dorsey") cover the federal criminal case against Strohm?

(d)

If the Dorsey engagement letter covers the federal criminal case, does it
incorporate by reference the attorney fees and/or 18% interest rate terms set
forth in the engagement letter from Strohm's predecessor counsel?

(e)

Does Utah public policy prohibit a pro se litigant such as Dorsey from
recovering attorney fees incurred in its collection action against a non-client
payor?

(f)

Did ClearOne have the right to terminate its obligations to Dorsey?

(g)

Since the district court previously ruled that the rate of counsel Milo Steven
Marsden ("Marsen") (ultimately determined to be $360 per hour) was
intended to be the highest rate under the Dorsey engagement letter, was it
an abuse of discretion or an error of law to order ClearOne pay rates of
$515 per hour and $400 per hour for out-of-state counsel?

(h)

Was it an abuse of discretion or an error of law to order ClearOne pay outof-state counsel rates that were higher than Utah rates and/or travel-related
expenses incurred by out-of-state counsel to travel to and from Utah?
1
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(i)

With respect to its attorney fees in Plaintiffs' civil case, were Plaintiffs
required to allocate their fees between those claims, on the one hand, which
authorize attorney fees and on which they were successful and, on the other
hand, all other claims?

(i)

Was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award fees to Plaintiffs on
the civil case in the absence of an allocation between successful claims that
authorize attorney fees and all other claims?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for review for each of the issues before the Utah Supreme Court is
the same, with additional considerations regarding certain issues discussed below.
Specifically, since the rulings and orders on appeal stem from the district court's entry of
summary judgment, the Court reviews the district court's rulings at issue de novo, or for
correctness, affording no deference to the district court's conclusions. See, e.g., Petersen
v. Riverton City, 2010 UT 58, If 8, 243 P.3d 1261 ("'We review a district court's decision
to grant summary judgment for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's
conclusions . . . . ' " (omission in original) (quoting Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009
UT 52, 116, 215 P.3d 933)); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1990) ("That
same lack of deference applies to the trial court's interpretation of statutes, which
likewise poses a question of law.").
With respect to issues (g), (h) and (i), if they are not reviewed for correctness, then
they may be subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988) (stating that the amount and reasonableness of
attorney fees awarded is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
<
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUES

The issues at bar were preserved below by ClearOne's memoranda and oral
arguments relating to the district court's rulings and orders under review. ClearOne
preserved the issues on appeal by raising them in the following papers: (1) Defendant's
September 26, 2008 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, or Alternatively, for
Summary Judgment, and for a Stay of Discovery (R. 448-96); (2) Defendant's October
20, 2008 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (R. 652-63); (3) Defendant's April 3, 2009 Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief (R. 1066-1103); (4) Defendant's September 15,
2009 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant's First Counterclaim for
Relief and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 20242174); (5) Defendant's December 1, 2009 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in
support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Third Claim for
Relief (R. 2794-2922); (6) Defendant's August 16, 2010 Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Petition for an award of reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs (R. 3631-77& 4276-4876); and (7) Defendant's February 22, 2011 Reply
Memorandum re: Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment (R. 4976-98).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

With respect to issues relating to the preclusion of ClearOne's indemnification of
Strohm because of her perjury conviction, the determinative statutes are Utah Code
sections 16-10a-902, -903, -905, and -907, which are included in the addendum.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is about the attempt by a small company, ClearOne, to stop exhorbitant
and runaway legal fees claimed necessary to defend Strohm against serious federal
criminal charges. The law firm, Dorsey, behaved as though it had been given a blank
check. After Dorsey had blown through its litigation budget, ClearOne exercised its
contractual right to stop advancing Strohm's criminal defense fees. While the district
court ultimately held that ClearOne had properly exercised its right to cease
advancement, Dorsey retaliated by suing ClearOne under numerous theories, including
breach of an ambiguous engagement letter. After extensive motion practice and
unnecessary and wasteful discovery, the district court ultimately handed ClearOne the
bill. Not only was ClearOne held liable for what the district court deemed reasonable
criminal defense fees, but also for interest at a usurious 18% rate plus 95% of Dorsey's
additional runaway legal fees in the civil case. Fed up with this state of affairs, ClearOne
now seeks relief in this Court.
On August 21, 2008, Strohm and Dorsey (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed a
complaint (the "Complaint") against ClearOne (R. 1-33). ClearOne moved to dismiss the
Complaint or alternatively for summary judgment, and Dorsey cross-moved for partial
summary judgment for breach of its engagement letter. On December 19, 2008, the
district court granted ClearOne's motion in part and established that Strohm had no
contractual or statutory right to advancement of her federal criminal defense fees, but
otherwise denied both motions (R. 730).

4
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On January 21, 2009, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, again seeking
advancement of Strohm's federal criminal defense fees. On February 12, 2009, the
district court granted the injunction insofar as it related to expenses for experts, fact
witnesses, and investigation necessary for Strohm's then-pending federal criminal trial,
but otherwise denied the motion (R. 963). On February 27, 2009, Strohm was convicted
of one count of felony perjury and acquitted on seven other counts (R. 4573).
Subsequent to Strohm's conviction, ClearOne moved for partial summary
judgment on Dorsey's engagement letter claim, which the district court denied "without
prejudice, subject to discovery" (R. 1569).
On July 29, 2009, Plaintiffs' filed their First Amended Complaint, which dropped
their claim for injunctive relief and added a claim for mandatory indemnification
(R. 1599-1600). On August 19, 2009, ClearOne filed its Answer and Counterclaims
against Strohm for breach of contract and related claims regarding Strohm's undertaking
promise to repay ClearOne if it was ultimately adjudged that she did not meet the
requisite standard of conduct (R. 1983-87).
On August 12, 2009, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment with respect
to Plaintiffs' recently asserted claim for mandatory indemnification (R. 1812-14).
ClearOne cross-moved for summary judgment on Strohm's undertaking promise to repay
ClearOne (R. 2024-25). The district court granted Plaintiffs' motion and denied
ClearOne's cross-motion (R. 2644), on October 26, 2009, and issued an "OrderIndemnification," on November 19, 2009, requiring ClearOne to indemnify Strohm for
the "reasonable expenses incurred by her in connection with the proceeding or claims
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
5 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with respect to which she has been successful" and to pay Strohm's "reasonable expenses
incurred in order to obtain court-ordered indemnification" (R.2772 ]f l(a)-(b)).
On November 5, 2009, Dorsey renewed its motion for partial summary judgment
with respect to the Dorsey engagement letter (R. 2645-47). ClearOne cross-moved for
summary judgment with respect to all claims in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint except
for the mandatory indemnification claim (R. 2886-88). On March 2, 2010, the district
court issued its Ruling and Order granting Dorsey's renewed motion (R. 2956-68).
On June 30, 2010, Dorsey filed its petition for attorneys' fees and costs (R. 29753150) and ClearOne cross-moved, inter alia, for a declaration that Utah public policy
prohibits use of corporate funds in connection with a claim on which a jury has
determined the corporate officer did not satisfy the requisite standard of conduct (R.
3631-32). On January 24, 2011, the district court issued its Ruling and Order granting in
part Dorsey's petition and granting ClearOne's cross-motion for a declaration on Utah
public policy (R. 5149-84).
On June 8,2011, the district issued Judgment to Plaintiffs for $972,737.37 in
criminal fees and expenses, $362,171.48 in interest on criminal fees and expenses (and
accruing at 18% until paid), and $865,490.41 in civil fees and expenses (and accruing at
2.3% until paid) (R. 5310-12). This appeal followed.
STATEMENT o r FACTS

Strohm was employed by ClearOne, most recently as CFO, until her resignation
effective December 5, 2003. On January 15, 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange

6
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Commission filed a civil action against ClearOne, Strohm, and then-CEO Frances M.
Flood ("Flood").
A.

Marsden, then at Bendinger, Was Not Retained to Handle a White-Collar
Criminal Defense
In late January 2003, ClearOne's then-co-CEO Michael Keough ("Keough")

signed an engagement letter written by Marsden, then at Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson &
Casey, P.C. ("Bendinger"), "to represent Susie Strohm's interests in connection with the
SEC civil complaint... and in connection with further related investigations and
litigation." In material respect, the Bendinger engagement letter stated "[a]ny amount
billed and unpaid after such thirty day period shall bear and accrue interest at the rate of
18% per annum from the date billed until paid" and "we shall be entitled to recover all
reasonable costs expended in connection with collecting amounts due under this
Agreement, including reasonable attorneys' fees" (R. 42-43). Marsden's rate under the
Bendinger engagement letter was $255 per hour, discounted by 10% (R. 43).
Bendinger was a "litigation boutique" consisting of 15-22 securities and antitrust
litigators (R. 2914, T18:l 1-21). As of January 2003 - when the Bendinger engagement
letter was signed - Marsden himself was not handling any white-collar criminal cases and
does not know if anyone at Bendinger was handling a white-collar criminal case (R.
4030, T19:9-22). As of January 2003, Marsden had not held himself out as a white-collar
criminal law specialist (id. at T19:23-20:4). In contrast, Flood's attorney Max Wheeler
("Wheeler") "is a highly visible criminal law specialist" and is "known in the community
as a criminal lawyer" (R. 2913, T17:25- R.2914, T18:5).
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B.

The Dorsey Engagement Letter
On March 31, 2004, Keough, then ClearOne's co-CEO, signed a second

engagement letter written by Marsden, which stated that he had left Bendinger and joined
Dorsey, that "our engagement agreement needs to be updated to reflect this move," and
"[t]he rest of this letter is intended to serve as the update" (R. 47). Marsden's rate under
the Dorsey engagement letter was $255 per hour, "subject to adjustment from time to
time." Ultimately, ClearOne paid $14,780 in 2004 for Dorsey to finish up the thenpending civil litigation involving Strohm.
C.

Bendinger Performs Virtually No Services in Connection with the Grand
Jury Investigation
Bendinger's invoices for its representation of Strohm from January 15, 2003

through January 14, 2004 do not make any reference to a U.S. Department of Justice
investigation or a grand jury investigation or to any potential criminal issue, except for
the following entries:
01/31/03 [Aaron G. Murphy] Research re: criminal liability; research re: causes of
action; attend joint defense meeting; conference w/S.
Marsden re: strategy and issues; call to S. Strohm. 7.70
hrs 150/hr 1,155.00
04/16/03 [Aaron G. Murphy] Review letter from R. Snow re: AUSA investigation.
.20 hrs 150/hr
30.00
R. 2847-66 (emphases added).
Marsden first learned about the grand jury investigation in January 2003 (R. 2916,
T66:10-13). Strohm was not asked to appear before the grand jury and never received a
subpoena from the grand jury (R. 2917, T73:25- R. 2918, T74:3; R. 2922, T169:6-l 1). In
connection with the U.S. Department of Justice investigation in 2003, there was very
8
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little for Bendinger to do because the U.S. Attorney was not talking to Strohm and
Marsden "wasn't going to go talk to the US Attorney" (R. 2918, T74:24-75:l 1).
D.

Marsden Does Not Disclose the Grand Jury Investigation as a Pending
Matter When He Informs Dorsey about His "Major Client" Strohm
When Marsden was considering switching firms, he completed a "Dorsey &

Whitney LLP Conflicts and Screening Report and Professional Background Information"
form (the "Dorsey Conflicts and Screening Report") on January 5, 2004 (R. 2881-85; R.
4035, T151:7-24). One of the questions on the Dorsey Conflicts and Screening Report
asked Marsden to:
Please identify your major clients who you would expect to become clients
of Dorsey & Whitney LLP upon your joining the firm. Please also identify
the adverse parties in the files on which you are currently representing these
clients.
R.2881.
In response to the above question on the Dorsey Conflicts and Screening Report,
Marsden identified "Susie Strohm" as one of his major clients and identified several
"adverse parties," but he did not identify the United States or the U.S. Department of
Justice, or the U.S. Attorney's Office as an adverse party (R. 2882). In addition, Marsden
listed the SEC Action and other civil litigations on the Dorsey Conflicts and Screening
Report, but he did not list any criminal investigation (Id.; R. 2919, T153:23-R. 2920,
T155:3). After his arrival at Dorsey, the first thing that led Marsden to believe that
Strohm might actually be criminally charged was when he was called by Assistant U.S.
Attorney Stewart "Stu" Walz ("Walz") in April or May 2007. (R. 2921, T165:24-R.
2922,T166:11).
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E.

Strohm Is Indicted Three Years Later and ClearOne Pays
Dorsey5s Criminal Invoices Pursuant to and Indemnification
Provision of Strohm's Employment Termination Agreement
More than three (3) years later, on July 25, 2007, Strohm was indicted by a federal

grand jury. ClearOne paid several months of Dorsey's invoices, then stopped paying
entirely. When Dorsey sent its engagement letter to ClearOne in late 2007, ClearOne
responded that it did not view the engagement letter as applicable to the federal criminal
proceeding. On February 27, 2009, Strohm was convicted on one count of perjury and
was acquitted on the remaining seven counts.
F.

ClearOne Terminates Dorsey's Representation of Strohm
On November 30, 2009, ClearOne sent a letter to Dorsey stating that while it did

not believe that the Dorsey engagement letter covered the federal criminal proceeding,
ClearOne requested that Dorsey withdraw immediately from any further representation
under the Dorsey engagement letter (R. 4872). Dorsey denied that ClearOne had the
power to terminate its obligations under the Dorsey engagement letter (R. 4874).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The district court erred in allowing Dorsey to recover civil case fees because Utah
public policy prohibits pro se law firms from recovering attorney fees on their own
collection actions. Utah public policy also prohibits the use of corporate funds after a
jury determination that a corporate officer did not satisfy the requisite standard of care.
Similarly, Strohm's perjury conviction disqualified her from mandatory indemnification
by virtue of ClearOne's governing corporate documents.
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With respect to the 2004 Dorsey engagement letter, the district court improperly
held that the letter compelled ClearOne to cover Strohm's then non-existent and
unanticipated federal criminal proceeding. Furthermore, the district court erroneously
held that the Dorsey engagement letter incorporated by reference the 18% interest and
attorney fees terms from the Bendinger engagement letter, despite the lack of a specific
reference to such terms and an indication that they were intended to be incorporated.
Even though ClearOne is not Dorsey5s client, fee agreement between lawyers and nonclient payers should be carefully scrutinized to ensure that they are fair to the payer.
(And they should be construed against the attorney-drafter).
ClearOne did not waive its right to contest the amount of attorney fees paid to
Dorsey prior to litigation and the district court erred by applying the Voluntary Payment
Doctrine. An 18% interest rate in an attorney engagement letter is unreasonable and thus
unenforceable as a matter of public policy. ClearOne also had the power to terminate its
payment obligations pursuant to the terms of the Dorsey engagement letter.
Dorsey charged excessive rates, hours, and travel expenses to defend Strohm in
the criminal case. With respect to the civil case, Dorsey must allocate its fees and
expenses between compensable and noncompensable claims and it was error for the
district court to conclude that Dorsey's civil fees were 95% compensable.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED DORSEY
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER DORSEY'S ENGAGEMENT LETTER BECAUSE UTAH
PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS A PROSELITIGANT (DORSEY) FROM RECOVERING FEES

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that a law firm is not entitled to
attorney fees in a pro se collection action even if the agreement includes an attorney fee
provision. See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374
(Utah 1996) ("Jones Waldo"). In this case, the district court authorized Dorsey to collect
attorney fees on its own engagement letter and distinguished Jones Waldo on the grounds
that Dorsey "also represents Ms. Strohm" (R. 2966) and that "Dorsey is not suing its
client" (R. 2967). In view of the public policy bases articulated by the Utah Supreme
Court for disallowing pro se litigants from recovering their own attorney fees, the district
court erred in distinguishing Jones Waldo and permitting Dorsey to recover attorney fees
on its own engagement letter.
In Jones Waldo, the Court was faced with a retainer agreement which stated that
"the undersigned ... agrees to pay all collection costs, including attorney's fees incurred
in the enforcement of this agreement." Id. at 1374. In holding that the law firm could not
recover its own attorney fees in connection with its collection action, the Court reasoned:
In Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 473 (Utah 1992), we recognized the
"general rule that pro se litigants should not recover attorney fees for
successful litigation." Although, as we acknowledged in Batchelor, the
jurisdictions are divided in their treatment of the issue, we here reaffirm our
view that the ability to competently present the claim without retained
counsel is a sufficient advantage for a lawyer-litigant.
There are other compelling public policy reasons for holding that "pro se
litigants should not recover attorney fees, regardless of their professional
status." Id. "Financing litigation by fee awards provides a new incentive to
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lawyers to increase their fees. The adversary's response is to litigate the fee
claim itself." Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries:
Introducing the Problem, 1986 Duke L.J. 435,438 [hereinafter Dobbs].
This gives rise to the danger of "creating a 'cottage industry' for claimants
... as a way to generate fees rather than to vindicate personal claims."
Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 714 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983)
(declining to award attorney fees for pro se representation to prevailing
plaintiffs under Freedom of Information Act). As the court in White v.
Arlen Realty & Development Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388 (4th Cir. 1980),
observed: "It is axiomatic that effective legal representation is dependent
not only on legal expertise, but also on detached and objective perspective.
The lawyer who represents himself necessarily falls short of the latter."
In addition, "in the case of a paying client, the lawyer who wants to retain
client satisfaction will have an incentive to limit the total fee. That
incentive is not present in fee award cases." Dobbs, supra, at 485.
Although the case at hand provides a working illustration of all of the
above problems, this last concern is probably the most serious. By way of
example, [Attorney] Shaw sought to charge [Client] Dawson $900 for his
time preparing for and appearing at trial as a witness. A captive client, such
as Dawson became in this collection action, has no control over the amount
of time the attorney will spend or how it will be spent. And plaintiff has no
motivation to explore less expensive collection alternatives.
Plaintiff points out that Batchelor treated an award of attorney fees under a
statute rather than a written retainer agreement as in the instant case. We
conclude that plaintiff is not aided by that difference.
M a t 1374-75.
Furthermore, the Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee has opined,
citing Jones Waldo, that "[u]nder Utah case law, a lawyer may not collect attorney's fees
in a pro se collection action, and a law firm may not collect attorney's fees in a collection
action in which the firm uses its own lawyers to collect debts of the firm." Utah State
Bar Eth. Advisory Committee Op. 96-09 (Nov. 1, 1996).
Therefore, Dorsey is not entitled to collect attorney fees in connection with its pro
se collection action against ClearOne. With respect to its Dorsey engagement letter
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claim, Dorsey is representing itself- not Strohm - and is therefore pro se (R. 25-26).
Since Dorsey is using only its own attorneys in the instant collection action against
ClearOne, and is seeking to collect pursuant to an engagement letter which it claims has
an attorney fees provision, Dorsey has not "incurred" and is not entitled to recover
"attorneys' fees" from ClearOne pursuant to the Dorsey engagement letter, for all of the
public policy reasons set forth in Jones Waldo.
II. UTAH PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS USE OF
CORPORATE FUNDS AFTER A JURY DETERMINATION THAT
THE REQUISITE STANDARD OF CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFIED

Utah corporations have authority to indemnify directors and officers in accordance
with the following provision:
[A] corporation may indemnify an individual made a party to a proceeding
because he is or was a director [or officer], against liability [including
counsel fees] incurred in the proceeding if:
(a) his conduct was in good faith; and
(b) he reasonably believed that his conduct was in, or not opposed to, the
corporation's best interest; and
(c) in the case of any criminal proceeding, he had no reasonable cause to
believe his conduct was unlawful.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902(l); see also id. 907(2). This statutory provision
establishes a Utah public policy prohibiting the use of corporate funds unless the
corporate director or officer has satisfied the requisite standard of conduct.
Strohm's perjury conviction is simply incompatible with these conduct standards.
In the federal criminal proceeding against Strohm, Judge Dee Benson instructed jurors
that in order to convict, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the
defendant knew [a material] statement [made under oath] was false [when] that statement
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was made" (R. 2110, 2114, 2160, 2168). Ultimately, the jury found that Strohm
knowingly lied under oath when she denied that she was involved in ClearOne's sale of
product to Production Audio - one of the primary transactions at issue in the federal
criminal case (R. 2099).
Turning to the relevant conduct standards, Strohm could not have acted in good
faith since she knowingly lied under oath in the SEC Action when she claimed that she
was not involved in the Production Audio sale. See U.S. v. Weissman, No. S2 94 Cr. 760
(CSH), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8540, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. June 16,1997) (stating that
Weissman's "perjury conviction was necessarily premised on a finding by the jury that he
engaged in 'deliberate dishonesty.'"); Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apt. Corp., 731
N.E.2d 577, 581 (N.Y. 2000) ("Because the underlying Federal judgment establishes that
Biondi's acts were committed in bad faith, Biondi is not entitled to indemnification and
cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here."); People v. Kazmierski, 25
P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo. 2001) ("False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made,
are the antithesis of good faith.").
Moreover, Strohm could not have reasonably believed that her conduct in lying
under oath in the SEC Action was in, or not opposed to, ClearOne's best interests.
Furthermore, by lying under oath in an official proceeding in federal court, Strohm had
reasonable cause to believe that her conduct was unlawful. See In re Adelphia
Communications Corp., 323 B.R. 345, 389 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Likewise (as a
consequence of the scienter requirement inherent in any criminal verdict), this Court
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cannot find that either of [the defendants] had no reasonable cause to believe that his
conduct was unlawful.").
Therefore, as a matter of Utah public policy, ClearOne's corporate funds cannot be
used to pay fees and expenses that are reasonably allocable to Strohm's perjury
conviction. This should include at least one-eighth of the pre-verdict reasonable fees and
expenses, plus all of the post-verdict fees and expenses. See Merritt v. Chapman & Scott
Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. 1974) (explaining that claimants are only
entitled to partial indemnification if they were successful in defending against some
counts, but were unsuccessful in their defense of other criminal charges). Significantly,
the district court ruled that Strohm is entitled to mandatory indemnification for the
"reasonable expenses incurred by h[er] in connection with the proceeding or claim[s]
with respect to which [s]he has been successful" (R. 2993-9411(a)). Utah public policy
requires a similar limitation on Dorsey's engagement letter claim as well.
Utah public policy addresses the purposes for which corporate funds can be used.
As expressly set forth in the "Indemnification" section of the Utah Revised Business
Corporation Act, indemnification for expenses incurred in connection with a proceeding
for which an officer is made a party by reason of her corporate status is limited to
conduct that satisfies the requisite standard of conduct. Thus, while "a corporation may
indemnify" a corporate officer who satisfies the requisite standard of conduct, a Utah
corporation is literally without authority to indemnify a corporate officer whose conduct
does not satisfy the requisite standard of conduct. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902(l)
(emphases added).
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In the district court, Dorsey contended that the court's determination that the
Dorsey engagement letter covers the criminal case "render[s] moot" any issue of
allocation of fees and expenses between the criminal counts on which Strohm was
successful and the perjury count on which she was convicted (R. 2976 n.l). Implicitly,
Dorsey contended that parties to an engagement letter can enter into an enforceable
contract in violation of Utah public policy. However, the standards of conduct
themselves would be rendered moot if a Utah corporation can be compelled by contract
to use corporate funds for a purpose that Utah law expressly prohibits. Clearly, no
contract governed by Utah law can be enforced in contravention of Utah public policy.
See Healey v. J.B. Sheet Metal Inc., 892 P.2d 1047, 1051-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(finding that indemnity clause violates Utah public policy and thus is void and
unenforceable); Jacohsen Constr. Co. v. Blaine Constr. Co., Inc., 863 P.2d 1329, 1329-30
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the "indemnification provision in the contract is void
because it contravenes public policy").
While the district court correctly held below that ClearOne did not have an
obligation to pay Strohm's post-verdict attorneys' fees and costs (R. 5153-54), it
erroneously held that Strohm's single perjury conviction was not sufficiently serious to
disqualify Strohm from indemnification altogether, stating:
The one perjury conviction, standing apart from the securities fraud
allegations, and coming later in time, does not carry the same force or
public policy concern. While the Court reiterates that Ms. Strohm should
not receive fees related to the single count upon which she was convicted,
this Court is persuaded that based on the overall success of her defense, and
her complete vindication of any securities fraud charges, it would be
inconsistent with both the indemnification statutes for officers, and the
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engagement agreements, to allow ClearOne to avoid both a statutory
responsibility and a contractual obligation it voluntarily incurred.
(R. 5153). Significantly, Strohm committed perjury in her official ClearOne capacity
when she testified under oath at the SEC's enforcement proceeding. Indeed, if Strohm
was not acting in her official capacity, corporate indemnification would not even be
potentially available to her. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902 (stating that "a
corporation may indemnify an individual made a party to a proceeding because he is or
was a director"). ClearOne urges that an officer convicted of committing perjury in her
official corporate capacity - indeed, in connection with a federal SEC enforcement action
- should not be entitled to indemnification in any respect, despite the district court's
attempt to minimize the seriousness of the felony of perjury. A felony is a felony.
In sum, since Strohm's perjury conviction establishes that she did not satisfy the
requisite standards of conduct, Utah public policy prohibits ClearOne's corporate funds
from being used to pay any of Strohm's attorney fees and expenses.
III. STROHM IS NOT ENTITLED TO MANDATORY INDEMNIFICATION
SINCE CLEARONE'S GOVERNING DOCUMENTS PROHIBIT INDEMNIFICATION
FOR OFFICERS W H O FAIL TO SATISFY THE REQUISITE STANDARD OF CONDUCT

ClearOne's articles of incorporation authorize the creation of bylaws to manage
the corporation:
The Directors shall and the shareholders may adopt By-Laws which are not
inconsistent with law or these Articles of Incorporation for the regulation
and the management of the affairs of this corporation. These By-Laws may
be amended from time to time, or repealed, pursuant to law.
(R. 1909, art. VIII (Articles of Incorporation of ClearOne predecessor Insular, Inc. (dated
July 8, 1983))). Pursuant to its Articles of Incorporation, ClearOne has adopted bylaws
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limiting indemnification to officers and directors who have satisfied the requisite standard of
conduct:
(a) Determination and Authorization. The corporation shall not indemnify
a director under this section unless:
(1) a determination has been made in accordance with the procedures set forth
in Section 16-10a-906(2) of the Act that the director met the standard of
conduct set forth in subsection (b) below; * * * *
(b) Standard of Conduct. The individual shall demonstrate that:
(1) his or her conduct was in good faith; and
(2) he or she reasonably believed that his or her conduct was in, or not opposed to,
the corporation's best interests; and
(3) in the case of any criminal proceeding, he or she had no reasonable cause to
believe his or her conduct was unlawful.
(R. 2077, art. 5.1 (emphases added)).
Since Utah Code sections 16-10a-903 and -907 expressly authorize a corporation to
limit mandatory indemnification, and since ClearOne's corporate governance documents
limit indemnification to officers and directors who can demonstrate that they met the
requisite standard of conduct, Strohm is not entitled to mandatory indemnification because
she cannot make that showing.
Moreover, ClearOne's bylaws expressly prohibit indemnification of a director
or officer unless "a determination has been made in accordance with the procedures
set forth in Section 16-10a-906(2) of the [Utah Revised Business Corporation] Act that
the director met the standard of conduct set forth in subsection (b) below" (R. 2077, art.
5.1(a)(1)). Thus, not only is Strohm unable to demonstrate that she has satisfied the
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requisite standard of conduct, but ClearOne's Board has not made a determination that
such standard has been satisfied.
To the contrary, on March 25, 2009, in view of the jury's verdict, ClearOne's
Board of Directors adopted the following corporate resolution:
Pursuant to Utah Revised Business Corporation Act Section 16-10a902(l)
and Article 5.1(b) of the Corporation's bylaws, the Board of Directors
has determined, in view of the Court's instructions to the jury with respect
to the Eighth Count of the Indictment (attached hereto) and the jury's
unanimous verdict (attached hereto) finding Ms. Strohm guilty of perjury
in connection with her testimony that she was not involved in the sale
of ClearOne product to Production Audio, that:
(a)

Strohm's conduct was not in good faith; and

(b)
Strohm did not reasonably believe that her conduct was in, or not
opposed to, the Corporation's best interests; and
(c)
Strohm had reasonable cause to believe that her conduct was
unlawful.
(R. 2082-83 If 1). Therefore, under the express terms of ClearOne's corporate
governance documents, Strohm cannot be indemnified and the district court erred in
ruling that Strohm was entitled to mandatory indemnification pursuant to Utah Code
section 16-10a-903 (R. 2772 f 1).
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND THE
DORSEY ENGAGEMENT LETTER TO COVER M S . STROHM'S THEN
NON-EXISTENT AND UNANTICIPATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDING

The district court ordered ClearOne "to pay Susie Strohm's reasonable legal fees
incurred in her defense of federal criminal proceeding" (R. 2967). The district court
ruled that the Dorsey engagement letter was ambiguous as to the scope of engagement specifically, whether it covered Strohm's federal criminal proceeding - and ambiguous as
to whether it incorporated by reference the attorney fees and 18% interest provisions
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from the Bendinger engagement letter (R. 2957). Having concluded that the Dorsey
engagement letter was ambiguous on these points, the district court then ordered
discovery of extrinsic evidence and ultimately held that the Dorsey engagement letter
incorporated said provisions and applied to the federal criminal case. ClearOne submits
that this ruling was erroneous because it is the attorney-draftsman of an engagement letter
who is required to clearly set forth its scope and terms. Since the engagement letter was
ambiguous, it should have been construed against its drafter as a matter of law.
Utah follows "the general principle that a court will strictly construe terms in a
contract against one who is 'both the attorney draftsman of and a party to the
instrument.'" Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449,451 (Utah 1989) (quoting Continental
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 102, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957)); see also
Ellsworth v. American Arbitration Ass % 2006 UT 77,117, 148 P.3d 983 ("Any
ambiguity in a contract is to be construed against the drafter."); Milk 'N' More, Inc. v.
Beavert, 963 F.2d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that "if there is ambiguity in the
clause we should construe it against the drafter"); Celgene Corp. v. KVPharm. Co., No.
07-4819, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58735, at *37 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008) (stating that
"contracts between lawyers and clients are construed against the lawyer").
The Dorsey engagement letter dated March 31, 2004 - signed and drafted by
"Milo Steven Marsden" - describes its scope as follows:
[T]his letter confirms your engagement of Dorsey & Whitney, LLP ("the
firm") to represent Susie Strohm in connection with the SEC civil
complaint, referenced above, and in connection with further related
investigations and litigation including, among others [3 then-pending civil
actions].
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(R. 47-50). The above description of the engagement is at best ambiguous with respect to
the federal criminal proceeding because the language does not reasonably convey to
ClearOne that it was intended to commit ClearOne to pay for a then-hypothetical and
unanticipated federal criminal proceeding. Specifically, the scope of engagement
reasonably describes the SEC civil complaint and further related civil investigations and
civil litigation.
ClearOne's responsibility for Strohm's legal expenses in any criminal proceeding
is not clearly or unambiguously expressed in the Dorsey engagement letter. The federal
criminal proceeding against Strohm does not constitute either an "investigation" or a
"litigation" "related" to the SEC civil complaint. Absent a definition in the agreement, all
terms must be construed in accordance with their "plain meaning." Kenny v. Rich, 2008
UT App 209, f 42, 186 P.3d 989. "Litigation," as that term is ordinarily used, refers to
civil litigation only. A person being criminally prosecuted would never say that they are
"litigating" with the government. Also, the specific listing of three civil cases in the
above-quoted language further demonstrates that civil litigation was what was
contemplated, not a criminal prosecution commenced by a federal indictment.
Significantly, the Dorsey engagement letter (dated March 31, 2004) was drafted
after Strohm's Employment Termination Agreement ("ETA") (dated December 5, 2003).
The ETA more broadly defined "Related Proceedings" to include "a grand jury
investigation being conducted by the United States Department of Justice" as well as
identified civil litigations (R. 35). Thus, the ETA does not characterize the grand jury
investigation as a "litigation" and uses the broader term "proceeding." Notably, the
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federal grand jury proceeding was defined in the ETA as one of the "Related
Proceedings" Clearly, Strohm's attorneys knew how to draft an agreement to clearly
and unambiguously cover a federal criminal proceeding. The Dorsey engagement letter,
in contrast, "confirms your engagement of Dorsey ... to represent Susie Strohm in
connection with the SEC civil complaint... and in connection with further related
investigations and litigation including [3 civil litigations]" (R. 47). Thus, the language
used in the Dorsey engagement letter is limited to related civil matters and does not cover
the federal criminal proceeding. Unlike the ETA, the Dorsey engagement letter does not
use the terms "criminal," "grand jury," "Department of Justice," "U.S. Attorney," or even
the term "proceeding."
Strictly construing the Dorsey engagement letter against its drafter, that document
simply does not set forth an agreement by ClearOne to pay Dorsey's fees in connection
with the federal criminal proceeding commenced more than three years later.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
THE DORSEY ENGAGEMENT LETTER INCORPORATED BY
REFERENCE THE TERMS FROM THE BENDINGER ENGAGEMENT LETTER

While the district court conclusorily ruled that "[t]he Dorsey & Whitney letter
implicitly incorporated the terms of the Bendinger letter, changing only those elements of
the former agreement that were specifically addressed" (R. 2964), it erroneously ignored
incorporation by reference rules and should be reversed.
As explained above, the Dorsey engagement letter should be strictly construed
against Dorsey. The district court erred by construing the term "update" in the Dorsey
engagement letter to mean "incorporate by reference." Indeed, even though while the
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Bendinger engagement letter was not attached to the Dorsey engagement letter, and none
of its terms were specifically referenced, the district court held that two highly prejudicial
terms from the Bendinger engagement letter - namely its 18% interest and the "Attorney
Fees" provisions - were incorporated by reference into the Dorsey engagement letter.
This interpretation should be rejected because the Dorsey engagement letter did not
reasonably apprise ClearOne that all the terms from the Bendinger engagement letter not
modified by the Dorsey engagement letter were to be deemed incorporated by reference,
just as if set forth fully therein.
When viewed in their entirety, the two engagement letters are stand-alone
documents. Specifically, the Dorsey engagement letter seeks to set forth the entirety of
terms that governed its representation of Strohm. The Dorsey engagement letter sets
forth the scope of engagement, the fees, rates, disbursements, billing and payment
methodologies, joint and several liability, advanced waiver of conflicts, and potential
options for ending the relationship (R. 47-50). Similarly, the Bendinger engagement
letter sets forth the scope of engagement, a $5,000 retainer, billing and payment
methodologies, joint and several liability, rates and staffing, potential options for ending
the relationship, an "Attorney Fees" provision, and an advanced waiver of conflicts (R.
42-44). Except for just four provisions, both engagement letters cover the same ground
and largely say the same thing.
The four varying terms consist of: (1) the $5,000 retainer, (2) when payment is
due, (3) the 18% interest provision, and (4) the "Attorney Fees" provision. While the
Bendinger engagement letter requested a $5,000 retainer, the Dorsey engagement letter
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did not. Dorsey does not contend that the $5,000 retainer provision somehow carried
over to the Dorsey engagement letter and required that a new retainer amount be paid to
Dorsey. No recipient of the Dorsey engagement letter would reasonably understand that
it was required to compare and contrast the two engagement letters from two different
law firms to determine which terms were not repeated in the second engagement letter so
as to figure out - according to Dorsey's logic - what terms actually governed Dorsey's
representation. See Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, 679 A.2d 1188, 1196
(N.J. 1996) ("When contracting for a fee, therefore, lawyers must satisfy their fiduciary
obligations to the client. The lawyer must explain at the outset the basis and rate of the
fee.").
The Dorsey engagement letter is, in fact, conversational in tone and would not
alert any potential client that it is attempting to sneak through two highly prejudicial and
controversial terms:
As you know, I recently left the law firm of Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson
& Case, and joined the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney LLP. Our
engagement agreement needs to be updated to reflect this move. The rest
of this letter is intended to serve as the update.
(R. 47). Marsden's use of the terms "updated" and "update" in this letter reflect merely
that he has switched law firms and that a new engagement letter needs to be entered into
"to reflect this move." Marsden does not call it a "new" engagement letter because his
representation of Strohm is simply continuing to allow the winding up and finishing of
the then-pending (and minor) civil litigations. Rather, he calls it an "update." The
"updated" "engagement agreement" is implicitly designed to take the place of the prior
engagement agreement - which explains why virtually all of the material terms of the
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engagement are repeated. Clients are entitled to a straightforward explanation of the
terms of their lawyer's engagement and should not be subjected to underhanded attempts
to incorporate by reference unfavorable terms from a document not attached to the
engagement letter. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated in Cohen:
Consistent with the special considerations inherent in the attorney-client
relationship, the attorney bears the burden of establishing the fairness and
reasonableness of the transaction. A court should construe an agreement
between a lawyer and a client "as a reasonable person in the circumstances
of the client would have construed it." Restatement [of the Law Governing
Lawyers] § 29A cmt. d. Those principles apply as readily to retainer
agreements as to other agreements between lawyers and clients.
Id. (citations omitted).
The district court's attempt to read into the Dorsey engagement letter the 18% and
Attorney Fees provisions from the Bendinger engagement letter is not reasonably
conveyed by the use of the term "update." Contrary to Dorsey's contention, "update"
does not mean "incorporated by reference" or "amended only as stated herein."
According to the American Heritage Dictionary, "update" means "[t]o bring up to date."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY

1406 (1980). Thus, Marsden brought ClearOne and

Strohm up to date by informing them that he had left his prior firm and joined Dorsey.
They were not brought up to date by Dorsey's alleged attempt to incorporate by reference
highly unfavorable terms from a prior engagement letter applicable to a different law
firm. In view of the foregoing, the district court erred in ruling the 18% and Attorney
Fees provisions are incorporated by reference in the Dorsey engagement letter.
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The district court erred by failing to recognize - as a general proposition of law that any attempt to incorporate terms from another document must clearly communicate
both the express terms and the intent to incorporate them into the document at issue:
To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with
detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly
indicate where that material is found in the various documents identified.
In other words, the incorporating contract must use language that is express
and clear, so as to leave no ambiguity about the identity of the document
being referenced, nor any reasonable doubt about the fact that the
referenced document is being incorporated into the contract.
. . . [T]he language used in a contract to incorporate extrinsic material by
reference must explicitly, or at least precisely, identify the written material
being incorporated and must clearly communicate that the purpose of the
reference is to incorporate the referenced material into the contract
(rather than merely to acknowledge that the referenced material is relevant
to the contract, e.g., as background law or negotiating history).
Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., Inc. v. United States, 535 F.3d 1339,1344-45 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (emphases added). While the Dorsey engagement letter references the fact that
Marsden has left Bendinger, it does not clearly or expressly communicate that the
purpose of the reference is to incorporate terms from the Bendinger engagement letter
into the Dorsey engagement letter. Nor are the express terms that Dorsey claims are
incorporated specified in any way.
In addition to clear and express communication, courts have held that "the party to
be bound by the terms must have had knowledge of and assented to the incorporated
terms." Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 983 A.2d 604, 617-18
(N.J. App. Div. 2009) ("Alpert Goldberg") (citing to other jurisdictions adopting this
principle). Moreover, in situations where an attorney's retention concerning fees and
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charges is at issue, there is has a higher ethical and professional duty on the part of the
attorney to provide complete information at the time of retention:
Merely directing the client to ask for another document that is not directly
presented and explained to the client but will bind him or her does not
fulfill the lawyer's obligation pursuant to [the Rules of Professional
Conduct] 1.4(c). This obligation to thoroughly explain all the terms of the
retention is particularly appropriate, given the lawyer has a unique and
fiduciary relationship with the client.
Id. at 616 (citations omitted). Here, such communication was not clear and, therefore, the
Court erred in ruling that the Dorsey & Whitney letter incorporated the terms of the
Bendinger engagement letter implicitly.
VI. FEE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN LAWYERS AND NON-CLIENT PAYERS
SHOULD B E CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED T O ENSURE THEY ARE FAIR T O THE PAYER

ClearOne submits that the 18% and Attorneys Fees terms are unreasonable and
unfair to ClearOne pursuant to Rule 1.5(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct,
which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an
unreasonable fee." Eighteen percent (18%) interest is significantly greater than the
reasonable time value of money over the last 2-4 years. This reference to 18% was in the
Bendinger engagement letter, but not the Dorsey engagement letter. Accordingly such
interest should not be enforceable.
In Alpert Goldberg, the court found that the retention letter making reference to a
separate document did not incorporate the terms of the separate document by reference,
and since a 12% interest charge was only set forth in the separate document, it was not
enforceable. 983 A.2d at 616-617 ("While [the law firm] made reference to [billing on
an hourly rate] and ... its 'standard billing practices and firm policies'), which would
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provide details, nothing in [the retainer letter ] would lead a reasonable client to conclude
that it would be paying twelve percent interest on late charges, [and] all collection fees
.... [The law firm] by inviting the client to seek out the [separate standard billing
practices and firm policies] instead of explaining the full terms of its retention,
impermissibly shifted its fiduciary duty to the client and undermined the intent and
purpose of [Rule of Professional Responsibility] 1.5(b).").
Additionally, it is unreasonable to assess Dorsey's attorney fees for the cost of the
instant litigation on ClearOne, which constitutes a significant departure from the
prevailing American rule, and is contrary to Utah public policy.
Further, the Dorsey engagement letter specifically references Marsden's thenhourly rate of $255 (R. 47)), a rate largely in line with his Bendinger rate of $255 per
hour with 10% discount (R. 42). Marsden's $255 hourly rate, however, differs vastly
from the rates that Dorsey is seeking to apply in this case. According to Rule 1.5(b), "the
basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be
communicated to the client." Utah R. of Prof 1 Conduct 1.5(b). While the Dorsey
engagement letter communicated Marsden's $255 rate, it did not attempt to apprise
ClearOne that it was somehow also committing to significantly higher out-of-town rates
by attorneys then unknown to ClearOne - not to mention Strohm herself. Thus, to the
extent the Dorsey engagement letter might be deemed to apply to the instant dispute, it
does not justify application of a rate higher than "the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar legal services." Utah R. of Prof 1 Conduct 1.5(a)(3).
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In sum, the Court should reject Dorsey's attempt to hold ClearOne responsible for
18% interest, attorney fees in this action, or a rate higher than $255 per hour.
VII. CLEARONE DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO CONTEST THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEY FEES PAID TO DORSEY PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF LITIGATION

The district court erroneously applied the Voluntary Payment Rule set forth in
Southern Title Guaranty Co, v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah 1988), to conclude that
ClearOne had effectively waived its right to contest the amount of attorney fees paid to
Dorsey prior to Dorsey's commencement of the instant litigation. Neither waiver nor the
Voluntary Payment Rule is applicable in the instant context.
Southern Title is simply inapposite to the case at hand - both factually and legally.
Significantly, the plaintiffs in Southern Title sought to clear the title to a plot of land that
had long before been sold with a deed properly transferred. Plaintiffs received notice that
the plot of land had already been paid for. Nevertheless, they still remitted an additional
payment to clear title to the land. Subsequently, they claimed that the defendant was
unjustly enriched by the payment and sought repayment of the money. The court utilized
the Voluntary Payment Doctrine in Southern Title to justify its decision that plaintiffs
were not entitled to repayment of the money that it had voluntarily paid with full
knowledge of the facts concerning the plot of land it sought to clear title to.
Here, in contrast, ClearOne is not seeking repayment of money - in this case, the
legal fees already remitted to Dorsey. Rather, ClearOne seeks a reasonability
examination and determination with respect the totality of the criminal defense fees
charged by Dorsey in this matter. In this regard, ClearOne seeks to have the legal fees
already paid by ClearOne to Dorsey attributed to the total amount of legal fees charged
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
30 may contain errors.

by Dorsey during the pendency of this matter. Since the reasonability analysis ClearOne
seeks does not involve a request for repayment of the pre-litigation legal fees paid by
ClearOne to Dorsey, the Voluntary Payment Doctrine is inapplicable here.
ClearOne has repeatedly argued that, in its reasonability analysis, the Court must
consider each of the Dorsey bills - including those that were paid in whole or in part
prior to the litigation. Indeed, ClearOne relied materially on the district court's stated
intent to look at the totality of fees in determining reasonableness:
I do think you're correct that we're looking at the totality of the entire bill
under our criteria here under both the rule and under the cases that control,
and we still talk about Dixie State Bank v. Bracken as the main one, but
there's others who have followed up in the years since. We look at the
totality, we look at the result, we look at a lot of factors, and I do think
we've got to look at it all.
(R. 4660, T8:10-17). As a result, it is imperative that this Court take into consideration,
not just the unpaid Dorsey legal bills, but the entirety of the legal fees and costs accrued
to date in order to determine whether the fees and costs paid may be subtracted from the
total amount of "reasonable" fees and costs. The district court ultimately failed to take
the total amount of Dorsey's fees into account in connection with its "reasonable" fee
analysis and, as a result, committed reversible error.
VIII. AN 18% INTEREST RATE IN AN ATTORNEY ENGAGEMENT LETTER IS
UNREASONABLE AND THUS UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF UTAH PUBLIC POLICY
The court below further erred in concluding that since the 18% interest provision
was a contractual provision, "it is enforceable unless determined to be unconscionable as
a matter of law" (R. 2966 (citing Knight Adjustment Bureau v. Lewis, 2010 UT App 40,
228 P.3d 754)). While enforcement of contractual provisions unless unconscionable is
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standard for the ordinary commercial context, Utah law governing the conduct of
attorneys - as set forth in the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and elsewhere requires more.
In particular, Rule 1.5(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct expressly
provides that:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.
Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.5(a). The rule proceeds to identify 8 factors "to be considered
in determining the reasonableness of a fee" and none of those factors involve or allow
charging interest for unpaid legal fees. Id.
Moreover, after ClearOne provided Dorsey with $225,000 to fund certain
expenses in January 2008, Dorsey neglected to deposit these escrowed funds into an
interest-bearing account for over a year and then, when Dorsey finally did so, the monies
earned interest averaging less than 1% per year before they were refunded to ClearOne in
July 2009. Given Dorsey's cavalier treatment of ClearOne's escrowed funds, Dorsey
should be equitably estopped from claiming interest at any rate.
IX. CLEARONE PROPERLY TERMINATED ITS PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS
PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE DORSEY ENGAGEMENT LETTER

The Dorsey engagement letter expressly states: "we will withdraw from
representation upon your request" (R. 48). On November 30, 2009 - nine months after
the jury's verdict and six months before Strohm was sentenced - ClearOne terminated its
payment obligations under the Dorsey engagement letter pursuant to this provision
(R. 4872). The district court erroneously held that ClearOne did not have the power "to
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unilaterally terminate the attorney-client relationship," which it claimed would be in
violation of Rule 1.16(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (R. 5151).
ClearOne never suggested, however, that it could force a severing of the attorneyclient relationship between Strohm and Dorsey. ClearOne sought merely to put a stop to
its own payment obligation, as allowed by the letter. If Strohm desires to engage Dorsey
after the termination of the Dorsey engagement letter obligating ClearOne, that is her
prerogative and she can enter into a new engagement letter without ClearOne's
involvement.
A.

ClearOne Has the Power, Pursuant to the Dorsey Engagement Letter, to End
Its Obligation to Fund Dorsey's Post-Verdict Work on Ms. Strohm's Behalf
The district court's holding that ClearOne did not have the power to terminate the

Dorsey engagement letter is erroneous because it requires giving two different
constructions of the term "y° u r " in the same document. The Dorsey engagement letter,
dated March 31, 2004, is addressed to both ClearOne (by then co-CEO Keough) and
Strohm. In the second paragraph, the letter expressly "confirms your engagement of
Dorsey" (R. 47 (emphases added)), thus presumably referring to both ClearOne (the first
recipient) and Strohm (the second recipient). Then, in its penultimate paragraph, the
letter states: "we will withdraw from representation upon your request" (R. 48
(emphases added)). The district court implicitly construed the first "your" to commit
both ClearOne and Strohm to the engagement, but construed the second "your" to mean
only Strohm. Under Utah law of contract construction, the same word should not be
construed differently in the same agreement.
As the court stated in Home Savings & Loan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

The correct rule is that a definition given to a term in one section of a
contract, even though it is not in the general definition section, applies
throughout the contract so that the term will be interpreted consistently
throughout.
817 P.2d 341, 348 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In other words, if the "your" in "your
engagement of Dorsey" refers both to ClearOne and Strohm, then the "your" in "your
request" must also refer to both ClearOne and Strohm. Nothing in the withdrawal
sentence indicates that the request to withdraw must be joint. Any contention that the
"your" in the withdrawal sentence really means "only Ms. Strohm" cannot withstand
analysis. If "your" means "only Ms. Strohm," then the "your" in "your engagement of
Dorsey" should mean that only Strohm has engaged Dorsey.
In writing the engagement letter, Marsden certainly knew how to specify Strohm
only if that was the intended meaning. In fact, Marsden's letter refers solely to Strohm
when that was the intent (R. 47 Tf 1 ("We will provide legal services for and on behalf of
Susie Strohm in connection with the above-described matters."); R. 48 (stating that "all
of my firm's professional responsibilities under applicable law are owed solely to
Ms. Strohm")). Since the Dorsey engagement letter used the term "Ms. Strohm" when it
intended to refer exclusively to her, the term "your" in the sentence "we will withdraw
our representation upon your request" must also refer to ClearOne. Therefore, ClearOne
has the right under the express terms of the Dorsey engagement letter to terminate that
agreement or, at least, to terminate ClearOne's obligation to pay pursuant to that
agreement.
Moreover, at his deposition, Marsden testified that it was ClearOne's outside
attorney who initially contacted him regarding representation of Strohm and it was clear
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

to him that he would be joining a defense team that would work jointly and be on
common ground with Flood's attorneys and ClearOne concerning the SEC investigation
(R. 5-55, T7:17-8:4; 8:18-22; R. 5056, Tl 1:1-8). Therefore, it should also have been
clear to Marsden that his engagement could be ended by ClearOne as well.
B.

Strohm Has No Incentive to Terminate Dorsey's Engagement if
ClearOne Has a Non-Terminable Obligation to Fund Strohm's Appeals
Moreover, Dorsey seeks to compel ClearOne to pay the attorney fees and expenses

of Strohm5 s appeal of the perjury count on which she was convicted. Presumably,
Dorsey contends that ClearOne has a non-terminable obligation to pay its fees to
prosecute Strohm's entire criminal appeal, any new trial that might be ordered, any
petition for rehearing that Dorsey might seek to file, any petition for writ of certiorari to
the U.S. Supreme Court, and any other related investigation and/or litigation.
According to the district court, only Strohm has the power to terminate Dorsey's
services (R. 5150-51). Strohm, of course, has no incentive to terminate Dorsey's services
as long as it is ClearOne, and not she, who bears the obligation to pay. Indeed, if Strohm
had to bear the burden of payment, she might well elect to accept the two years of
probation and perform the 150 hours of community service to which she was sentenced.
Significantly, Strohm could probably complete the community service and satisfy her
probationary period before any decision on her appeal would be rendered.
It is precisely this scenario about which this Court expressed concern in Jones
Waldo, wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated:
[I]n the case of a paying client, the lawyer who wants to retain client
satisfaction will have an incentive to limit the total fee. That incentive is
not present in fee award cases. Although the case at hand provides a
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working illustration of all of the above problems, this last concern is
probably the most serious. By way of example, [Attorney] Shaw sought to
charge [Client] Dawson $900 for his time preparing for and appearing at
trial as a witness. A captive client, such as Dawson became in this
collection action, has no control over the amount of time the attorney will
spend or how it will be spent. And plaintiff has no motivation to explore
less expensive ... alternatives.
923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 1996) (quotations and citation omitted).
C.

Any Ambiguity in the Dorsey Withdrawal Clause Should Be Construed
against Dorsey to Authorize ClearOne's Termination of Obligation to Dorsey
To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the "withdrawal" clause of the Dorsey

engagement letter, such ambiguity should be construed against its attorney-draftsman.
Utah follows "the general principle that a court will strictly construe terms in a contract
against one who is both the attorney draftsman of and a party to the instrument." Phillips
v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449,451 (Utah 1989).
Moreover, absent a definition in the agreement, all terms must be construed in
accordance with their "plain meaning." Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989, ^ 42, 2008 UT App
209. Plainly, when Marsden uses the terms "I" and "we" in a conversational-tone letter
to refer to himself and Dorsey, the term "you" refers to the parties to whom it was
addressed - namely, ClearOne and Strohm, both of whom signed the Dorsey engagement
letter. Having committed itself to withdrawing from representation upon "your" request,
Dorsey cannot now disregard ClearOne's November 30, 2009 request to withdraw.
While noting and preserving its position on the scope of the Dorsey engagement,
ClearOne made its intent clear:
So as to avoid any confusion, we are writing at this time to clarify that
ClearOne will not under any circumstances pay any invoices for services
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rendered or costs incurred after the [November 30, 2009] date of this letter
pursuant to the Dorsey Engagement Letter.
(R. 4872).
In sum, since ClearOne terminated any payment obligation it may have had under
the Dorsey engagement letter on November 30, 2009, ClearOne cannot be liable for any
attorney fees or costs incurred after that date.
X. DORSEY CHARGED EXCESSIVE RATES, HOURS, AND
TRAVEL-RELATED EXPENSES TO DEFEND STROHM IN THE CRIMINAL CASE

While Dorsey submitted its extensive billing history in its criminal defense of
Strohm - but only for the period after March 2008 - the task descriptions and block
billing entries are too insufficiently detailed to determine what the attorney or paralegal
was actually doing.
This much is clear: in the aggregate, Dorsey billed at rates exceeding those
customarily charged in Salt Lake City, often provided insufficient information to permit
ClearOne to determine what tasks were being performed, billed excessive hours for the
amount of work required, and invoiced ClearOne for travel-related expenses that would
not have been necessary if a local attorney had led Strohm's criminal trial defense team.
A.

The District Court Erred in Awarding Fees Higher than the $360 Rate
Determined by the District Court to Be the Highest Rate Chargeable
In its March 2, 2010 Ruling and Order, the district court concluded:
Dorsey & Whitney, as a large national firm, generally charged higher
billing rates than were customary at Bendinger, Crockett, and the Court
would suggest customary in this community at that time. In the Bendinger,
Crockett engagement letter, Mr. Marsden recites his rate at $255 per hour,
however, he also agrees to discount his rate by 10% under the agreement.
The letter further recites that the rates are reviewed and adjusted annually.
The letter indicates that billings shall be based on normal hourly rates for
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all employees of the firm who work on the matter, but the Court determines
that the reasonable intention of the parties to be drawn from the Bendinger,
Crockett letter is that Milo Steven Marsden was the lead attorney, and that
except in unusual circumstances, his rate would be the highest rate.
Fee discussion in the Dorsey letter restates Mr. Marsden's rate of $255 per
hour, subject to adjustment, without reference to a discount.
(R.2965).
Then, in its January 24, 2011 Ruling and Order, the district court concluded that
Marsden's time should be awarded at $360 per hour for the criminal case given the
passage of years from the March 31, 2004 Dorsey engagement letter until Dorsey's work
on Strohm's criminal defense from 2007 through 2009 (R. 5168). ClearOne does not
contest this ruling or any of the district court's findings with respect to the customary
local rates for Dorsey's Utah attorneys (R. 5168-69).
However, the district court abused its discretion by finding that the proper rate for
William Michael ("Michael") - Strohm's lead criminal counsel - should be $515 per
hour (R. 5167-68) and that Christopher Shaheen's("Shaheen") rate should be $400 per
hour (R. 5168). While both attorneys are based in Minneapolis, their awarded rates
should not exceed the rates customarily charged in Utah.
Significantly, the district court determined that Marsden's rate "except in unusual
circumstances ... would be the highest rate" (R. 2965). The district court held that the
Dorsey engagement letter was intended to cover Strohm's federal criminal case (see Point
IV above), and rejected ClearOne's contention that it did not intend to retain Marsden for
any criminal case, even though Marsden - by his own admission - is not regarded as a
white collar criminal defense attorney:
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[N]othing in the evidence supports the view that Mr. Marsden was so
unidentified with criminal practice that his retention requires a conclusion
that the two letters did not contemplate criminal defense.
In fact, in the Salt Lake legal market, some of the best practitioners may
wear two or more hats. Indeed, Max Wheeler, who has been cited in this
case as the quintessential white collar criminal lawyer, is also well known
as a skilled litigator in complex commercial matters, among others. There
is not[h]ing anomalous about the roles assumed in this case by
Mr. Marsden or his colleagues.
(R.2962).
Having concluded that the engagement letters - which the district court construed
as a single agreement - expressly contemplated a criminal defense by Marsden, the
district court then subsequently offers a contradictory explanation to justify exceeding the
$360 customary local rate:
[WJhile plaintiffs argue, and the Court has agreed, that the specter of
criminal proceedings was known to ClearOne from the beginning, the
ultimate form and complexity was not known. It was a matter of
professional responsibility for Dorsey to staff the case as it evolved, with
lawyers best able to represent Ms. Strohm. There can be little argument
that Mr. Michael was an appropriate choice. Mr. Michael's time shall all
be calculated at $515 per hour.
(R. 5167-68).
ClearOne respectfully submits that it was an abuse of discretion for the district
court to hold, on the one hand, that criminal proceedings were expressly contemplated
and that Marsden was fully capable of "wear[ing] two or more hats" as commercial and
criminal defense counsel, but that the ultimate form and complexity of the criminal
proceeding was not known, thus justifying a higher-priced out-of-locality attorney.
In particular, the district court concluded that criminal proceedings were expressly
contemplated in part because ClearOne, Strohm, and Flood had entered into a Joint
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Defense Agreement that expressly referenced "the fact that ClearOne was notified
directly by the United States Department of Justice that an investigation was underway,
in connection with the SEC action" (R. 2961). In view of this conclusion, it was
contradictory for the district court to conclude in a subsequent decision that Strohm's
indictment arising out of that same federal grand jury investigation constituted an unusual
circumstance justifying a rate greater than the $255 set forth in the Dorsey engagement
letter, or the $360 per hour that the district court concluded was reasonable for Marsden
in 2007-09.
With respect to this rate issue, Dorsey offered nothing more than the vague and
conclusory contentions of their "expert" declarations (R. 1846 ^ 9 ("Based upon my
review and my knowledge and expertise, it is my opinion that the hourly rates charged by
each of the Dorsey lawyers in the Criminal Case is a reasonable hourly rate, and that the
rates charged by Dorsey are within the range of prevailing market rates charged by other
lawyers performing work in Salt Lake City with similar experience, for similar work.");
R. 1820 U 8(b) ("I have personally reviewed each of the rates sought, and it is my opinion
that they are in line with prevailing rates in the community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.")).
Nonetheless, the district court summarily rejected the opinion of ClearOne's
expert that the rates charged by Wheeler and Snow, Christensen & Martineau ("Snow
Christensen") - the Salt Lake City law firm representing Strohm's co-defendant Frances
Flood in the criminal proceeding - reflected the rates customarily charged in the locality
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for similar services, concluding that Snow Christensen's rates were "arguably too low"
(R.5166).1
In view of the foregoing, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to
award rates to out-of-locality attorneys higher than the $360 rate that was found
reasonable for Marsden in view of the $255 rate set forth in the 2004 Dorsey engagement
letter.
B,

Dorsey Charged Travel Expenses, Hotel Costs, and Travel Time that would
Not Have Been Necessary if Utah Counsel Had Been Retained
Since Strohm did not need to retain lead trial counsel from Minneapolis,

Minnesota, even if such a counsel was retained, it was not reasonable for such counsel to
charge Minneapolis rates for a criminal proceeding pending in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Moreover, it is not reasonable to charge ClearOne the additional travel and travel-related
expenses that Dorsey incurred because Minneapolis counsel needed to travel by air to
conduct witness interviews, meet with Strohm, and participate in the trial. Additional
travel-related expenses such as rental cars, hotel rooms, and meals also would typically
not have been incurred at all if Utah counsel had been assigned to handle Strohm's
defense.
The district court held that ClearOne is obligated to pay whatever travel expenses
Dorsey incurred because "it does not see a legitimate basis either on general terms, or
under the facts of this case, to secondguess the assignment of specific counsel, regardless
of where those counsel are located" (R. 5170). This was error for at least two reasons.
1

ClearOne's expert was attorney and Professor James R. Holbrook from the University
of Utah Law School.
41
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First, Utah law requires that all fees and expenses be reasonable and customary in the
locality. Second, ClearOne retained a Salt Lake City attorney Marsden to
represent Strohm's interests and reasonably understood that legal services would be
performed locally. Contrary to the district court's suggestion that it was somehow
ClearOne's burden to "place any restrictions on the identity or geographic location of
counsel" (R. 5170), the Dorsey engagement letter never apprised or sought ClearOne's
consent for such non-locality travel and related expenses.
C.

Dorsey Charged Excessive Hours in Connection with the Criminal Case
Moreover, Dorsey charged excessive hours. While Snow Christensen charged

4,331.75 hours for all timekeepers through verdict, Dorsey charged a whopping 8,199.25
hours for all of its timekeepers through verdict - an unjustifiable 89% more than Snow
Christensen. The excessiveness of Dorsey's hours is further described in Professor
Holbrook's Declaration:
Dorsey's case management was unreasonable and resulted in excessive fees
(e.g., 27 Dorsey lawyers and 38 Dorsey paraprofessionals have worked on
the Criminal Case compared to 8 Snow Christensen lawyers and 9 Snow
Christensen paraprofessionals who worked on the Criminal Case). In other
words, three times as many Dorsey lawyers and more than four times as
many Dorsey paraprofessionals worked on the Criminal Case as compared
to Snow Christensen.
(R. 44081J8(f)). The excessive hours charged by Dorsey in the Criminal Case is more
specifically detailed in the Declaration of Professor Holbrook (R. 4422-26ffl[41-47), and
will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that Dorsey has no justification for spending
more hours defending Strohm than Snow Christensen spent defending Flood.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

XI. IN ITS CIVIL CASE, DORSEY CAN ONLY RECEIVE
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES ALLOCABLE TO CLAIMS THAT BOTH
AUTHORIZE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND ON WHICH PLAINTIFFS WERE SUCCESSFUL

"[AJttorney fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter of right under a contract or
statute." Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). "Fees provided for by contract,
moreover, are allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the contract." Id; see
also IHCHealth Servs., Inc. v. D&KMgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73,139, 196 P.3d 588. As
the Utah Supreme Court held in the seminal case of Foote v. Clark:
[A] party seeking fees must allocate its fee request according to its
underlying claims. Indeed, the party must categorize the time and fees
expended for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an
entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims
for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees.
962 P.2d at 55. Despite this clear requirement, Dorsey's attorney fee petition concerning
its civil case did not even attempt to "allocate" or "categorize" their attorney fees and
expenses between, on the one hand, the two claims on which the district court held that
there is an entitlement to reasonable attorney fees - namely, Dorsey's claim for breach of
the engagement letter and Strohm's mandatory indemnification claim - and, on the other
hand, the 6 or 7 other claims in the Complaint for which no attorney fees are available.2

2

Plaintiffs' original Complaint dated August 21, 2008 contained one claim for breach of
the Dorsey engagement letter and seven other claims on which no attorney fees were
available. When Plaintiffs amended their Complaint on July 29, 2009, Plaintiffs added a
claim for mandatory indemnification, but still maintained six other claims on which no
attorney fees were available.
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A.

At Most, Dorsey Is Entitled to Recover Reasonable Attorney Fees Allocable to
Dorsey's Engagement Letter Claim and Strohm's Statutory Mandatory
Indemnification Claim
On November 18, 2009, the district court ruled that, pursuant to Utah's mandatory

indemnification statute, "ClearOne shall pay Ms. Strohm's 'reasonable expenses incurred
in order to obtain court-ordered indemnification' pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a903 and 907(1)" (R. 2993-94 ^ 1(b)). On March 2, 2010, the district court ruled that
"Plaintiffs are also entitled to judgment for interest and fees incurred in seeking recovery
under the [Bendinger/Dorsey] letter agreements" (R. 3010). Thus, at most, Dorsey is
entitled to reasonable attorney fees and expenses in the civil case only with respect to
such fees and expenses in connection with Strohm's mandatory indemnification claim
and Dorsey's engagement letter claim.
Rather than requiring Dorsey to allocate its fees among all of the claims asserted
by Plaintiffs, the district court improperly relieved Plaintiffs of this duty because,
according to the district court, "it would be incorrect to suggest that the Court has not had
to consider [Strohm's ETA] and its provisions in reaching its determinations" (R. 5174).4
However, the issue is not whether the Court considered Strohm's ETA. The law, as
correctly stated but misapplied by the district court, is that "'a prevailing party may
3

If the Court agrees with ClearOne that Dorsey is not entitled to attorney fees in
connection with its pro se breach of engagement letter claim, then Strohm is entitled to
civil fees only in connection with her statutory mandatory indemnification claim.
4
Strohm asserted in both her original and amended complaint a claim contending that
ClearOne breached her Employment Termination Agreement ("ETA") (R. 25fflf78-84) a claim on which there was significant motion practice and document and deposition
discovery. Not only did Strohm not prevail on her ETA claim, but there is no entitlement
to attorney fees on said claim. Thus, it was erroneous for the district court to require
ClearOne to pay Dorsey's attorney fees on the ETA claim merely because it found it had
to consider that agreement.
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collect attorney fees on noncompensable claims only if those claims substantially overlap
with compensable claims'" (R. 5174 (quoting Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f 128, 130
P.3d325)).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs' seven noncompensable claims do not "substantially
overlap" with their two compensable claims, even though they all seek to result in
payment to Dorsey.5 Plaintiffs' ETA claim involved the interpretation of an
indemnification provision imposing Utah statutory and bylaws limitations. In contrast,
the Dorsey engagement letter claim involved a separate and independent contract that the
district court held was ambiguous. Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment
claims also involve discrete elements and an analysis of separate factual issues.
Moreover, since the Dorsey engagement letter entitlement to attorney fees must be
strictly construed, its provision calling for attorney fees "expended in connection with
collecting amounts due under this Agreement" cannot be construed to cover legal fees
expended in prosecuting Plaintiffs' remaining claims.
While Plaintiffs are, at best, only entitled to fees and costs in connection with
these two claims, Plaintiffs' original and amended Complaints in this action contained
eight claims. In fact, Strohm's mandatory indemnification claim was not added until July
29, 2009 - five months after the February 27, 2009 verdict. Moreover, the motions,
briefing, hearings, and discovery in this action involved significant issues other than the

5

Plaintiffs' original complaint included claims for declaratory relief under the Utah
Code, injunctive relief, Strohm's ETA breach claim, Dorsey's engagement letter breach
claim, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, indemnification under the Utah Code, and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. 22-30).
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Dorsey engagement letter and Strohm's subsequent mandatory indemnification claim.
Indeed, no discovery was needed for the mandatory indemnification claim.
B.

Only Two Depositions - and None of the Discovery Documents - Were
Relevant to the Dorsey Engagement Letter Claim
Significantly, Dorsey researched and drafted the original Complaint to support

eight theories of recovery - only one of which carries any potential entitlement to
attorney fees. ClearOne moved to dismiss the entire Complaint and Dorsey cross-moved
for summary judgment on the Dorsey engagement letter claim. The parties extensively
briefed these motions, and the Court ultimately denied both in December 2008. While
Dorsey sought expedited discovery, very little document discovery - and no depositions
- occurred until after the criminal jury's verdict. Indeed, since Dorsey moved for
summary judgment on its engagement letter claim almost immediately, Dorsey must not
have believed that discovery was necessary for such claim at that time.
On the eve of the criminal trial, Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to compel
ClearOne to pay Dorsey's fees and expenses, but the Court denied injunctive relief,
except for certain evidentiary-gathering expenses allegedly needed to support Strohm's
defenses. While Plaintiffs represented to the Court in the civil case that Strohm urgently
needed the testimony of a witness in Australia, no such witness or testimony was ever
introduced at the criminal trial.
One of the primary issues in dispute between the parties before the verdict was the
meaning of Strohm's Employment Termination Agreement - a claim that does not carry
attorney fees. Plaintiffs also sought to press their promissory estoppel and unjust
enrichment claims by asserting ClearOne's history of SEC filings and budgeting of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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anticipated attorney fees in the Criminal Case - issues also not relevant to the original
intent of the Dorsey engagement letter.
After the verdict, Plaintiffs pressed for extensive deposition and document
discovery, but then amended their complaint and moved for summary judgment on
Strohm's mandatory indemnification claim - a claim on which no discovery was
necessary. In October 2009 - a month during which almost 19% of Dorsey's Civil Case
charges were incurred - Plaintiffs deposed former co-CEO Keough, ClearOne's current
Information Technology Manager Josh Ihrig, prior counsel Jefferson Gross ("Gross"),
ClearOne Board members Larry Hendricks, Scott Huntsman, and Brad Baldwin, and
ClearOne's outside auditor Mark Low. Plaintiffs' demands for additional depositions
were ultimately dropped. ClearOne deposed only one witness: Marsden. Extensive
documentary evidence involving expensive and time-consuming e-discovery also ensued.
Only two of the deposition witnesses testified about the Dorsey engagement letter.
No additional documents relating to the Dorsey engagement letter were uncovered. On
the ClearOne side, Keough was the only witness who knew anything about it. Keough
also testified about Strohm's Employment Termination Agreement, his recollection of
Board meetings and the Special Litigation Committee, and his departure from ClearOne.
On the Dorsey side, Marsden testified minimally about the engagement letters: he
drafted them, sent them to ClearOne (he did not remember how), and they each came
back signed without any discussion or negotiation. Thus, while ClearOne does not
dispute that some of the deposition discovery was relevant to Dorsey's engagement letter
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claim, it was a relatively small part of the territory covered at the eight depositions that
were taken.
C.

Dorsey Engaged in Wasteful Discovery Practices
Dorsey engaged in wasteful discovery practices. Even if such practices are not

sanctionable, they should not, at the very least, be compensable. Dorsey insisted upon
taking the depositions of three ClearOne Board members and one outside auditor - none
of whom could shed any light on the original understanding of the Dorsey engagement
letter. In addition, in response to Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) deposition notice, attorney Jefferson
Gross was produced to discuss the negotiation history of Strohm's ETA, and Josh Ihrig
was produced to discuss ClearOne's information technology practices. Whatever benefit
Dorsey may claim it derived from these depositions concerning Plaintiffs' declaratory
judgment, Employment Termination Agreement, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment,
statutory (non-mandatory) indemnification, and good faith and fair dealing claims, there
can be no dispute that these witnesses had no relevant knowledge of the Dorsey letter.
Dorsey continued its practice of flying attorneys in from Minneapolis to take
depositions in Salt Lake City. Most of Plaintiffs' depositions were conducted or
defended by Minneapolis attorneys. In fact, Marsden's October 14, 2009 deposition was
defended by one of Dorsey's Minneapolis litigators, Shaheen, with Michael also in
attendance. Michael billed 9.4 hours, Marsden billed 9.5 hours, and Shaheen billed 10
hours on that day. Indeed, Michael's entire role in the civil case appears to be duplicative
and unnecessary. Other than Michael's declaration in this case concerning the
timekeepers involved in the Criminal Case, it is entirely unclear why Michael - co-chair
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of Dorsey's White Collar Crime and Civil Fraud practice group (R. 3152 If 3) - billed
significant amounts of time to the Civil Case at all. Charging 152.8 hours to the civil
case to date - at an average rate of $583 per hour - there appears to be no substantive
task that he performed that was not duplicative of what other Dorsey attorneys were also
doing. Plaintiffs' Petition failed to demonstrate what value Michael added to the civil
case. Nor should ClearOne be required to pay for his attendance - not to mention his
charged travel time and travel-related expenses - at hearings in Utah during which
Michael played no substantive role and appeared to be only an observer.
The district court erroneously disregarded all of the above, ruling only that the
entirety of Dorsey's civil fees should be reduced by 5% because of Dorsey's equitable
claims (R. 5174-75). Since Dorsey is not entitled to attorney fees or costs that are
allocable to noncompensable claims on which it did not prevail, the district court's
judgment should be vacated to the extent that it awards such fees and costs.
D.

Dorsey is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees For its Unsuccessful Motions or for
Unnecessary Work
Prevailing parties are not entitled to recover attorney fees incurred on prior

unsuccessful summary judgment motions. See Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp, 2010
UT App 361, If 52, 246 P.3d 131 ("If attorney fees are recoverable by contract, a party is
entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights."
. . . Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's attorney fees award and remand with
instructions to subtract the fees incurred pursuing the unsuccessful motion for summary
judgment." (additional quoations and citations omitted)). Therefore, Dorsey is not
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f

entitled to attorney fees concerning its unsuccessful summary judgment motions, its
unsuccessful motion for advancement, and its unsuccessful motion for an injunction.
CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, ClearOne respectfully requests that the Judgment
of the district court be vacated in its entirety. Specifically, the award of 18% and civil
attorney fees and costs should be vacated and, at a minimum, the criminal attorney fees
and costs should be reduced to reflect Utah rates.
DATED this 13th day of October, 2011.
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.

James E. Magleby
Christopher M. Von Maack
Jennifer Fraser Parrish
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
ClearOne Communications Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD,
P.C, 170 South Main Street, Suite 850, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that pursuant to
Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF was delivered to the following this 13th day of October, 2011
by:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[X] Electronic Mail
Milo Steven Marsden
marsden. steve@dorsey. com
Cameron M. Hancock
Hancock.cameron@dorsey.com
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP

136 South Main Street, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Susie Strohm
and Dorsey & Whitney LLP
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1 of 5 DOCUMENTS
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2011 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** Statutes current through the 2011 2nd Special Session. ***
*** Annotations current through 2011 UT 51 (08/23/2011); 2011 UT App 294 (09/01/2011) and September 1,2011
(Federal Cases). ***
TITLE 16. CORPORATIONS
CHAPTER 10a. UTAH REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
PART 9. INDEMNIFICATION
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902 (2012)
§ 16-10a-902. Authority to indemnify directors

(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4), a corporation may indemnify an individual made a party to a proceeding
because he is or was a director, against liability incurred in the proceeding if:
(a) his conduct was in good faith; and
(b) he reasonably believed that his conduct was in, or not opposed to, the corporation's best interests; and
(c) in the case of any criminal proceeding, he had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful.
(2) A director's conduct with respect to any employee benefit plan for a purpose he reasonably believed to be in or
not opposed to the interests of the participants in and beneficiaries of the plan is conduct that satisfies the requirement of
Subsection (l)(b).
(3) The termination of a proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere
or its equivalent is not, of itself, determinative that the director did not meet the standard of conduct described in this
section.
(4) A corporation may not indemnify a director under this section:
(a) in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation in which the director was adjudged liable
to the corporation; or
(b) in connection with any other proceeding charging that the director derived an improper personal benefit,
whether or not involving action in his official capacity, in which proceeding he was adjudged liable on the basis that he
derived an improper personal benefit.
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Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902

(5) Indemnification permitted under this section in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the
corporation is limited to reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 16-10a-902, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 109.
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1 of 4 DOCUMENTS
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2011 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** Statutes current through the 2011 2nd Special Session. ***
*** Annotations current through 2011 UT 51 (08/23/2011); 2011 UT App 294 (09/01/2011) and September 1, 2011
(Federal Cases). ***
TITLE 16. CORPORATIONS
CHAPTER 10a. UTAH REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
PART 9. INDEMNIFICATION
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-903 (2012)
§ 16-10a-903. Mandatory indemnification of directors

Unless limited by its articles of incorporation, a corporation shall indemnify a director who was successful, on the
merits or otherwise, in the defense of any proceeding, or in the defense of any claim, issue, or matter in the proceeding,
to which he was a party because he is or was a director of the corporation, against reasonable expenses incurred by him
in connection with the proceeding or claim with respect to which he has been successful.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 16-10a-903, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 110.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2011 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** Statutes current through the 2011 2nd Special Session. ***
*** Annotations current through 2011 UT 51 (08/23/2011); 2011 UT App 294 (09/01/2011) and September 1, 2011
(Federal Cases). ***
TITLE 16. CORPORATIONS
CHAPTER 10a. UTAH REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
PART 9. INDEMNIFICATION
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-905 (2012)
§ 16-10a-905. Court-ordered indemnification of directors

Unless a corporation's articles of incorporation provide otherwise, a director of the corporation who is or was a party
to a proceeding may apply for indemnification to the court conducting the proceeding or to another court of competent
jurisdiction. On receipt of an application, the court, after giving any notice the court considers necessary, may order
indemnification in the following manner:
(1) if the court determines that the director is entitled to mandatory indemnification under Section 16-10a-903, the
court shall order indemnification, in which case the court shall also order the corporation to pay the director's reasonable
expenses incurred to obtain court-ordered indemnification; and
(2) if the court determines that the director is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in view of all the
relevant circumstances, whether or not the director met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in Section
16-10a-902 or was adjudged liable as described in Subsection 16-10a-902(4), the court may order indemnification as
the court determines to be proper, except that the indemnification with respect to any proceeding in which liability has
been adjudged in the circumstances described in Subsection 16-10a-902(4) is limited to reasonable expenses incurred.
HISTORY: C. 1953,16-10a-905, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 112.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2011 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** Statutes current through the 2011 2nd Special Session. ***
*** Annotations current through 2011 UT 51 (08/23/2011); 2011 UT App 294 (09/01/2011) and September 1, 2011
(Federal Cases). ***
TITLE 16. CORPORATIONS
CHAPTER 10a. UTAH REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
PART 9. INDEMNIFICATION
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-907 (2012)
§ 16-10a-907. Indemnification of officers, employees, fiduciaries, and agents

Unless a corporation's articles of incorporation provide otherwise:
(1) an officer of the corporation is entitled to mandatory indemnification under Section 16-10a-903, and is
entitled to apply for court-ordered indemnification under Section 16-10a-905, in each case to the same extent as a
director;
(2) the corporation may indemnify and advance expenses to an officer, employee, fiduciary, or agent of the
corporation to the same extent as to a director; and
(3) a corporation may also indemnify and advance expenses to an officer, employee, fiduciary, or agent who is
not a director to a greater extent, if not inconsistent with public policy, and if provided for by its articles of
incorporation, bylaws, general or specific action of its board of directors, or contract.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 16-10a-907, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 114.
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EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AGREEMENT
This Employment Termination Agreement ("Agreement") is entered into by and between
ClearOne Communications, Inc. ("ClearOne" or the "Company") and Susie S. Strohm
("Strohm") (ClearOne and Strohm shall sometimes be hereinafter referred to collectively as the
"Parties").
RECITALS
A.
Strohm has been employed by ClearOne in a variety of positions, most recently as
the Company's Chief Financial Officer.
B.
On January 15, 2003, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
filed a civil action against ClearOne, Strohm, and Frances M. Flood, who was then serving as the
Company's Chief Executive Officer, alleging various improprieties and misstatements in
connection with the Company's financial statements (the "SEC Action").
C.
The filing of the SEC Action has spawned, and may continue to spawn, multiple
related proceedings, including, but not limited to, multiple shareholder securities class actions,
multiple shareholder derivative actions, a grand jury investigation being conducted by the United
States Department of Justice, a dispute and potential litigation between the Company and its
directors and officers liability insurers, and potential litigation between the Company and its
former auditor, Ernst & Young (collectively, "Related Proceedings").
D.
Soon after the filing of the SEC Action, the Company placed Strohm on a paid
administrative leave of absence, and this paid administrative leave has continued in effect at all
times up to the execution of this Agreement.
E.
Strohm has employed separate counsel, Milo Steven Marsden and the law firm of
Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey, PC (collectively, "BCP&C"), to defend her in the SEC
Action and the Related Proceedings. BCP&C has also represented Strohm in connection with
the negotiation and drafting of this Agreement.
F.
Strohm has made various demands on the Company for indemnification and for
advancement of the attorneys' fees and costs she has incurred to date, as well as the attorneys'
fees and costs she may subsequently incur, in connection with the SEC Action and the Related
Proceedings and has provided the Company with written undertakings, dated August 29, 2003
and September 3,2003, in conformity with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-904.
G.
ClearOne referred Strohm's demands for indemnification to its Special Litigation
Committee ("SLC") comprised of two independent directors. The SLC reviewed those demands,
as well as similar demands for indemnification made by other present or former officers and
directors of the Company, in conjunction with its investigation of the various' claims asserted in
the multiple shareholder derivative actions filed against certain of the Company's present and
former officers and directors, including Strohm. On October 13, 2003, the SLC completed its
investigation concerning the derivative actions and the indemnification demands and issued its
reports to the Company wherein it concluded, inter alia, that pursuing the derivative actions was
not in the best interest of the Company and that the Company should attempt to negotiate a
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settlement of Strohm's indemnijScation demands in the context of negotiating a global
settlement of all potential claims and counterclaims between the Company and Strohm. In
reliance on the SLC's conclusions and recommendations, the Company has moved to dismiss the
derivative actions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-l()a-740(4)(a) and has negotiated this
Agreement with Strohm.
Strohm and ClearOne desire to resolve any and, all disputes that may exist
between them, whether known or unknown, including, but not limited to, disputes regarding
Strohm's demand for indemnification, disputes relating to Strohm's employment with ClearOne,
and disputes relating to the termination of that employment relationship.
AGREEMENT
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises i ov uiiils, n Hmmlics,
and agreements set forth herein, the Parties mutually agree as follows:
1.
Effective Date. I his Agreement is effective on the eighth day following Strohm's
signing of this Agreement, provided that Strohm does not revoke her. execution of this
A^TKcment as provided, in,. Paragraph 19 below.
2.
Receipt of this Agreement. Strohm, acknowledges that she received a emm I I In
Agreement on December 2, 2003, and that she has 21 days from the receipt of this / [(
i
which to consider and consult with an attorney regarding this Agreement. Strohm further
acknowledges that she has had an adequate amount of time in which to consult with BCP&C, her
counsel of choice, with, respect to the contents of this Agreement prior to signing.
3.
Payment to Strohm. Upon the expiration of the revocation period described in
Paragraph 19 below and the unrevoked signing of this Agreement by Strohm, ClearOne shall pay
Strohm the sum of $75,000. The Parties acknowledge and agree that this payment is being made
in consideration of, inter alia, the Company's purchase of Strohm's shares of the Company's
common stock, the Company's cancellation of Strohm's options to purchase additional shares of
the Company's common stock, and the release of all claims that Strohm may have against the
Company, all as more fully stated in Paragraphs 5, 6, and 9 below. The Pa.irti.es also
acknowledge and agree that the Company is not responsible for the withholding of any federal or
state taxes from said payment and that Strohm is responsible for paying any taxes that may
become due .and owing as a result of her receipt of said payment,,
4.
Resignation of Employment,
ClearOne effective December 5,2003.

Slrohin harhy resigns her iimplc <
" 'iiiini i l l

"mlIII

5.
Cancellation of" Stock Options. As partial consideration for the payment specified
in Paragraph 3 above, upon the expiration of the revocation period described in Paragraph 19
below and the unrevoked signing of this Agreement by Stro'hm,,, all unexercised stock options
acquired by Strohm during her employment with the Company, whether vested or unvested, shall
immediately be deemed cancelled. Strohm represents and warrants that, immediately prior to the
effective date of this Agreement, she holds vested and unvested stock options entitling her to
purchase up to a, total of 268,464 shares of the Company's common,, stock and that 171,963 of
these options are vested Strohm, further' agrees that all of her rights, entitlements, and. benefits
562912.2
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under the 1990 Gentner Stock Option Plan and the 1998 ClearOne Stock Option Plan, including
any agreements entered into in relation to the foregoing plans, are hereby terminated and
cancelled.
6.
Transfer of Stock. As partial consideration for the payment specified in
Paragraph 3 above, upon the expiration of the revocation period described in Paragraph 19 below
and the unrevoked signing of this Agreement by Strohm, Strohm shall transfer, assign, and sell to
the Company i 5,500 shares of the Company's common stock.
7.
Cooperation in Related Proceedings. Strohm shall cooperate with the Company
and its counsel in the defense and/or prosecution of the SEC Action and the Related Proceedings.
Strohm's cooperation shall include, but shall not be limited to, voluntarily providing deposition
and trial testimony, meeting with the Company and its counsel for the purpose of preparing for
depositions or trial proceedings, and providing information and documents to the Company or its
counsel in connection with the defense and/or prosecution of the SEC Action and the Related
Proceedings. With respect to any request by the Company and/or its counsel for deposition or
trial testimony, meetings, information, or documents, the Company shall give reasonable notice
to Strohm of its request, including the time and place of the deposition, trial, or meeting, and
shall reimburse Strohm for all reasonable expenses incurred by her, including reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs, in providing the requested cooperation.
8.
Indemnification. Subject to the limitations imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a902 and the Company's articles of incorporation and bylaws, and also subject to the undertakings
referred to in Recital F above, ClearOne shall indemnify Strohm for any liability and for all
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by her in connection with the SEC Action or any
Related Proceedings, whether incurred before or after the effective date of this Agreement. The
Company's duty to indemnify Strohm is further conditioned upon Strohm's fulfillment of her
duty under Paragraph 7 above to cooperate "with the Company and its counsel in connection with
the SEC Action and Related Proceedings.
9.
Release of Claims by Strohm. Strohm, on behalf of herself and her heirs and
assigns, hereby completely releases and discharges ClearOne and all of ClearOne's predecessors,
successors, parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates, and all of their respective present and former
directors, officers, employees, attorneys and agents (hereinafter collectively referred to as
'^Releasees") from any and all existing claims and causes of action of every kind and nature,
whether presently known or unknown by the Parties, including but not limited to any claims or
causes of action for breath of implied or express contract, libel, slander, wrongful discharge or
termination, discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and/or
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the
Utah Antidiscrimination Act, local laws prohibiting age, race, religion, sex, national origin,
disability and other forms of discrimination, or any other federal or state law that may be
applicable thereto, claims growing out of any legal restrictions on ClearOne'srightto terminate
its employees, any tort claim or other claim arising in any way out of the employment
relationship between Strohm and ClearOne or the termination of that relationship. Strohm
specifically waives any and all claims for back pay, front pay, or any other form of compensation
for services, except as set forth herein.

562912.2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
3
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Except as expressly stated in Paragraph 8 above, Strohm hereby waives any right to
recover damages, costs, attorneys' fees, and any other relief in any proceeding or action brought
against ClearOne by any other party, including without limitation the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the Utah Antidiscrimination and Labor Division, on Strohm's
behalf asserting any claim, charge, demand, grievance, or cause of action released by Strohm as
stated above,
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Strohm does not waive rights, if any, Strohm may have to
unemployment insurance benefits or workers1 compensation benefits. Nothing in this
Paragraph 9 prohibits Strohm from paying COBRA premiums to maintain Strohm's
participation, if any, in ClearOne's group health plan to the extent allowed by law and by the
terms, conditions, and limitations of the health plan.
10.
Release of Claims by ClearOne. Except for any claim as to * liich
indemnification is not allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902 and any claim that may accrue
under the undertakings referenced in Recital. F above, ClearOne, on behalf of itself and its;
successors and assigns, hereby completely releases arid discharges Strohm from all existing
claims and causes of action of any kind and nature, whether presently known or unknown by the
Parties, including but not limited to any claims or causes of action arising out of or relating to
Strohm's employment with ClearOne,
1 11
No Assignment of Claims. Strohm represents and warrants that she has not
previously assigned oi transferred, or attempted to assign or transfer, to any third party, any of
the claims waived and released, herein.
12
No Claim Filed. Strohm represents that she has not filed any claim, complaint,
charge, or lawsuit against ClearOne or any other Releasee with any governmental agency or any
state or federal court, and covenants not to file any lawsuit at any time hereafter for any matter,
claim, or incident known or unknown which occurred or arose out of occurrences prior to the
date hereof.
13.
No Admission of liability. This Agreement does not constitute an admission of
any fault, liability, or wrongdoing by any Releasee, nor an admission that Strohm has any claim
whatsoever against ClearOne or any other Releasee. ClearOne and all other Releasees
specifically deny having any liability to Strohm or having committed any wrongful acts against
Strohm. This Agreement does not constitute an admission of any fault, liability, or wrongdoing
by Strohm, nor an admission, that ClearOne has .any claim against Strohm. Strohm specifically
denies having any liability to ClearOne or having committed any wrongful acts against
ClearOne.
14.
Additional Consideration. Strohm acknowledges and agrees that as of the date
she signs this Agreement, ClearOne has paid to Strohm (a) all compensation for wages earned,
less normal payroll deductions, (b) all amounts due for earned vacation pay less normal payroll
deductions, and (c) all other amounts due and owing to Strohm by ClearOne. Strohm agrees and
acl mowledges that the sums paid pursuant to this Agreement are in addition to any si lms or
payments to which Strohm would be entitled but for the signing of this Agreement.
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15.
Conditions Subsequent. This Agreement is conditioned upon Strohm signing
settlement documents in the SEC Action by December 5, 2003, and upon thefinal,approval of
the settlement of the SEC Action, as it applies to Strohm, by January 31,2004. If for any reason
Strohm fails to satisfy either of these conditions, this Agreement will automatically become null
and void, and the Parties shall forthwith return to each other any and all consideration received
by them pursuant to this Agreement
16.
Integration Clause. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and
understanding of ClearOne and Strohm concerning the subject matter hereof, and except as
expressly noted herein, this Agreement supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations, proposed
agreements, agreements or representations whether written or oral concerning the subject matter
hereof. ClearOne and Strohm agree and acknowledge that neither ClearOne or Strohm, nor any
agent or attorney of either, has made any representation, warranty, promise or covenant
whatsoever, express or implied, not contained in this Agreement, to induce the other to execute
this Agreement. No amendment, alteration, or modification of this Agreement shall be effective
unless made in writing and signed by both Parties.
17.
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, without giving effect to Utah's choice of law
rules.
18.
Voluntary and Knowing Signing. Strohm acknowledges that she has read this
Agreement carefully and fully understands this Agreement and that she has consulted with her
attorney, BCP&C, prior to signing this Agreement. Strohm acknowledges that she has executed
this Agreement voluntarily and of her own free will and that she is knowingly and voluntarily
releasing and waiving all claims she may have against Releasees, including ClearOne.
19.
Revocation Period. Strohm has seven (7) days from the date on which she signs
this Agreement to revoke this Agreement by providing written notice, by mail, hand delivery, or
facsimile, of her revocation to:
Raymond J. Etcheverry
Parsons Behle & Latimer
Counsel for ClearOne
201 South Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Facsimile: (801)536-6111
Strohm's revocation, to be effective, must be received by the above-named person by the
end of the seventh day after Strohm signs this Agreement. This Agreement becomes effective on
the eighth day after Strohm signs this Agreement, providing that Strohm has not revoked this
Agreement as provided above.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement on the dates
indicated below.
CLEARONE COMMUNICATION IN

12,
Dated:

C7 o ^

Hy:
Its:

i.flcd

CJSO

k> \fi \i)A
SUSIE S.STROHM

J

562912.2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
6
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Addendum 6

I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ouNuiiNs.MM C R O C K E T T , P E T E R S O N h C A S E Y P C
GAR» r

6£N0ING£R

I f t I ¥

iTQ SOUTH MAIN. SuiTE 400

R J C H A R O w CASE*

MtuQ STEv£N M A R S O C N

»A4-T U \ K £ CITY U'TAfl ft*iOi«i63$

WCSLCY o rzu*
j O n * n OOGART
REBEC C * & P A R R
C I & A R PETERSEN

FAC5IMIU£1

< a o i i Q.'j- i * a «
C'HAIW
ill if O&OC pClfw.COfTI

or COUM^W

ROGER O SANDACts

EvELt* J FURSE
* A R £ N w. M*Rf iNE2
Cn£RY«_ MORt-ATmr<$ON

P A T R I O M A. 0 R O R A C

Luiua,, "),^I]U

SCOTt £ WARI*«C*
RYAN B Ffl*2tER

S E A * H EGAN
ROaERT j M00R6

Mr, Greg Rand, Co CEO
Mr. Mike Keough, Co-CEO
Ms. Susie S. Strohm
CtearOnc Communicar
...:.
1825 Research Way
Sail Lake City, Utah
• Re:

IP 11,

A PROFESSIONAL. CORPORATION

STCPnCN 6 CftQCHETT
ROBERT * ^ETCRSON

S.EC v Oearnne Commumcuuons. Inc.. Frances M hiood. and Susie Strohm

Dcai CJI eg, Mike and Susie:
This letter will summarize and confirm the agreement for my firm, Bendinger, Crockett.
Peterson & Casey to represent Susie Strohm's interests in connection with the SEC civil
complaint, referenced above, and in connection with funher related investigations and litigation
1.
Purpose of Employment -• Subject to the leiratsand conditions set forth below, my
firm will render legal services to Ms. Strohm. in connection, with the ubuve mailers.
2. , Retainer -- Our agreement to represent Ms,.. Su ohm is subject 10 Clearone
Communications, inc.'s ("Clearone") payment of a retainer totaling $5,000. The retainer fee
shall be held in trust by us and shall be used to pay the last fees incurred under this agreement, In
the event the $5,000 is more or less than is owed, we will either bill OT refund the difference.
Billing - We will provide Ms. Strohm with a bill each month for all fees, charges
and other expenses (such as long distance telephone calls, copying costs, postage, filing fees,
deposition costs, travel expenses, expert witness fees and similar expenses), determined in
accordance with this Agreement,
Clearone will pay the full- amount of our bill within rhiny days after receipt. Any amount
billed and unpaid after such thirty day period shall bear and accrue interest at the rate of 18% per
annum from the date billed until paid. The accrual and payment of interest on unpaid balances
shall not affect our right to withdraw in the event of non-payment as provided in paragraphs
below. Under Utah law, we have a lien on your causes of action in this lawsuit for the payment
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Mr. Greg Rand, Co-CEO
Mr. MiKe Keough, Co-CEO
Ms. Susie S, Strohm
January 29, 2003
Page 2

of fees under this Agreement. Ms. Strohm and Clearone agree to be jointly and severally
responsible for payment of all amounts billed under this Agreement.
Notwithstanding the ubove, Clearone understands and accepts that all my firm's
professional responsibilities under applicable law are owed solely to Ms, Strohm.
4.
Rates and Staffing - We shall be entitled to decide who the appropriate firm
employee is for any particular task. Your billing shall be based on the normal hourly rates
charged for employees of thisfirmwho work On this matter. 1 will be primarily responsible for
Ms. Strohm* * representation. My hourly rate is presently $255 per hour. However, I have agreed
to discount my hourly rate by ten (10> percent under this Agreement: The rates we charge are
reviewed and adjusted annually. Our next review wil] occur at the end of this year.
5.
Withdrawal for Non-pavment of Bills — In the event you fail to pay the charges
and expenses on a current basis as provided in paragraph 3, we reserve, and you agree that we
have the absolurerightto withdraw from thts representation. Written notification of withdrawal
under this paragraph shall be provided to you and you shall be granted a five day period to cure
any such non-payment prior to withdrawal. You agree that we remain entitled to our full accrued
fee, notwithstanding that we withdraw or you discharge us and obtain substitute counsel before
we have completed ail assignments under this agreement:
6.
Withdrawal - We reserve therightto withdraw from this matter for any just
reason as permitted or required under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct or as permitted by
the Rules of the Courts of the State of Utah. You agree to our withdrawal under such
circumstances.
7.
Attorney Fees — In the event of termination of this Agreement, we shall be
entitled to receive billed or unbilled fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this matter. In addition,
we shall be entitled to recover all reasonable costs expended in connection with collecting
amounts due under this Agreement, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
8.
Conflicts - No conflict of interest is created by my firm's representation of Ms.
Sirohm, and should a potential conflict arise, Ms. Strohm agrees to waive the same, if
appropriate.
If the foregoing correctly sets forth our agreement and understanding with respeci to these
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Mr. Greg Rand, Co-CEO
Mr. Mike Keough, Co-CEO
Ms. Susie S. Suohm
January 29, 2003
Page 3

maners, please acknowledge the same by signing below, and by returning the executed original,
with your retainer check to me. We look forward to representing yon in this matter
Sincerely yours,

Mifo Steven Marsden
AGREED AND ACCEPTED:
Clcaiooe Communications, Inc ,

-,.

^fctoLSKslvr
Susie S, Sirohm
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D O R S E Y

MILO STEVEN MAMSDEN

Phone: (801) 933*8944
Fax: (801) 933-7373
iiiarsden.steve@dorsey.eoni

March 31, 2004
Mr, Michael Keough, CEO
ClearOne Communications, Inc.
1825 Research Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Ms. Susie S. Strohm
2158 Mesa Circle
Sandy, UT 84092
Re:

Dear Mike and Susie:

SEC v. Clearone Communications, Inc., Frances M. Flood, and Susie
Strohm

-

'

As you know, I recently left the law firm of Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey, and
joined the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney LLP. Our engagement agreement needs to he updated
to reflect this move. The rest of this letter is intended to serve as the update.
In particular, this letter confirms your engagement of Dorsey & Whitney, LLP ("the
firm") to represent Susie Strohm in connection with the SEC civil complaint, referenced above,
and in connection with further related investigations and litigation including, among others,
Anderton v. ClearOne Communications, Inc., et aL, Master File No. 2:03-CV-0G62-PGC; John
Gore>vJRA v. Frances Flood, et aL, Civil No. 030918066; and E-Bond Epoxies, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan and Trust v. Frances Flood et aL, Civil No. 030906061. This letter further confirms
our discussions and agreements about our services and charges.
1*
Sendees. We will provide legal sendees for and on behalf of Susie Strohm in
connection with the above-described matters.
-•
Fees, Disbursements and Billing. Our fees are ordinarily based primarily on our
usual and customary hourly rates. My current hourly rale is S255 Our hourly rates are subject to
adjustment from time to time. Our fees may also be affected by factors such as the amount
involved in the representation, unusual time constraints, use of prior work product, and overall
value of the sendees,
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP • WWW.DORSE.VXQM - T 601 933 7360 F 801.933.7373
170 SOUTH MAIN STREET • SUITE 900 SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84 501-1055
USA
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MichaelKeougfa
Susie Strohm
March 31,2004
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D O R S B Y

Disbursements for certain items, such as filing fees, travel expenses and long distance
calls „are usually advanced by us, then billed to clients. We sometimes ask providers, such as
court reporter, expert witnesses or filing sendees, to submit certain substantial charges directly to
clients. Our service charges for such items as computerized research will be billed at our own
costs, direct and indirect, Facsimile service and photocopying will be billed at $.50 and $.20 per
page, respectively. Long distance telephone and facsimile transmission costs are in addition to
the per page fax costs. We will submit monthly statements, describing services performed, and
stating fees and other charges and total discounts* Payment will be due on receipt.
Ms, Strohm and Clearone agree to be jointly and severally responsible for payment of all
amounts billed under this Agreement, Notwithstanding the above, Clearone understands and
accepts that all my firm's professional responsibilities under applicable law are owed solely to
.Ms. Strohm,
3*
Other Representations, We request that a signed copy of this letter be returned
to indicate agreement that while this firm is representing Ms, Strohm; (I) the firm may represent
other clients on unrelated matters which may be adverse to Ms. Strohm, and (2) with respect to
any parties who may be adverse to Ms. Strohm during our representation of Ms, Strohm, we may
represent such parties on unrelated matters. These agreements are made on the following
understandings. First, the firm will not use confidential client information against Ms. Strohm
and second, while the firm represents Ms. Strohm the firm will not undertake litigation in which
Ms, Strohm is a directly adverse party.
4.
Completing Our Services. We intend and expect to complete our services to
your satisfaction. However, we will withdraw from representation upon your request We may
also withdraw if our fees are not paid timely or for a reason required or permitted by professional
rules.
We greatly appreciate the opportunity to be of service. If there are any questions about
our services, or the fee and billing arrangements, please call me.

Sincerely yours,
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP

/klMiul—
Milo Steven Maisden

DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
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Michael Keough
Susie Strohm
March 31,2004
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AGREED AND ACCEPTED:
Clcarone Coiimiumeaaon^ mc,

By:
Susie S. Strohm

OG8SEY 4 WHITNEY LLP
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Michael Keough
Susie Strohm
March 31,2004
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AGREED AND ACCEPTED:
Clearone Communications, Inc.

By:
Its:

By: _ ^ C J q i l ^ ^ M l ^ , ^ = i
Susie S. Strohm

OORSEV I WHITN£Y LIP
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Third Judicial District

NOW: 2009
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SALT LAKE COUNTY

SALT LAKE COUNTV, STATE OF UTAH
SUSIE STROHM and DORSEY &
WHITNEY, LLP,

Deputy Clerk

ORDER-INDEMNIFICATION

Plaintiffs,

CLEARONE
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Civil No. 080917500
Honorable Robert K. Hilder

Defendant.
On Monday, October 26,2009, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presided over oral
argument on the following motions: (i) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (filed
August 12,2009); and (ii) Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant's
First Counterclaim for Relief (filed September 15,2009). Counsel for the parties appeared in
person and via telephone. Plaintiffs Susie Strohm ("Ms. Strohm") and DORSEY & WHITNEY,
LLP ("Dorsey") were represented by Milo Steven Marsden and Cameron M. Hancock of DORSEY
& WHITNEY, LLP. Defendant ClearOne Communications, Inc. ("ClearOne") was represented by
Brian S. Cousin and Neil A. Capobianco of SEYFARTH SHAW LLP.
Based on the pleadings and papers onfilewith the Court, the arguments of counsel at the
hearing, the undisputed material facts, and Utah Code Ann. § 16- 10a-901 etseq.,forgood cause
shown, andforthe reasons stated on the record during the October 26,2009 hearing, the Court
hereby GRANTS and DENIES the motions as ^fo
1.

ITieCourt^G

ordersthat:
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Mandatory Indemnification:-"Under Utah Code Ann, §§ 16-10a-903
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States v, Flood, et al in the I Jnited States District Court for the
District of Utah (Case No. 07-00485); and '•
b.

Expenses to Obtain Indemniication: Pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §
. ln-iOd-905*
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The Court DENIES Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to-.-

'Defendant's First Counterclaim, for Relief; and
3.

3

.'•/'•

Pursuant to tliib Couitspieviousiu uv ;-*fn

••.••/•.••.
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*
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amount and reasonableness of any expenses, including attorney's fees, and thr allocaii n , f

be determined at a later date, follow ing subr , >^>r. of aflfida\ us and such other proc A, _mg- ^
may oe required lor
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* remaining issues,
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4.

The foregoing Order is entered after full consideration of ClearOne's objection to

Ms. Strohm's proposed Order and the exchange or arguments related thereto. This Order reflects
the Court's rulings as to the objection and responses.
DATED this 18th day of November 2009.
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Defendant.

"'; ••• Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion, for Partial 'Summary Judgment on. their
Third ciaim^ for Relief" (Engagement Agreements), and defendant's •cross.
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either or both engagement letters.

RULING AND ORDER

The first engagement letter, dated

January 29, 2003, was between counsel Milo Marsden and his prior firm,
Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey, Susie Strohm, and ClearOne
Communications. The second letter, dated March 31, 2004, was between Mr.
Marsden and his new firm, Dorsey & Whitney, Susie Strohm, and ClearOne
Communications.
The Court had previously declined to grant summary judgment based
on the engagement letters, because of facial ambiguity concerning the
scope and purpose of the agreements. (See, Transcript of hearing dated
July 1, 2009.) Because of its concern, the Court ordered that discovery
should take place regarding the intentions of the parties to the
engagement letters, before the Court could either consider the matter on
renewed Motion, or the parties could be prepared to bring the matter to
t r i a l - . • • "••

After some skirmishing regarding discovery, defendant ultimately
produced Michael Keough, ClearOne's Chief Executive Officer at the time
both engagement agreements Were signed.

Mr, Keough is not presently

employed by ClearOne, but defendant indicated that he is, in fact, the
only person with knowledge regarding the engagement letters.
ClearOne argues with vigor that the Court should not consider the
testimony of Mr. Keough for a number of reasons, including claims that
the testimony was elicited through improperly leading and hypothetical
questions, some of which were outside the scope of
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designation

Keough revealed bias" a^air-c-*

ano* al sc thn^ "--

RULING \ND ORDER
CleatOhe'

because h e n a a jjeen involuntarily relieved of h i s position, as. CEO in
June", '2004..

ClearOne also asserts that M r Keough's testimony on the

scope^ of the Dorsey engagement letter was contradictory, in that u n chc
one hand he"testified that the'engagement letters were not intended t~
give anything m^re ' •- iv*s~ *-:*"*oi«» t^^i* ^nai ^ 1A e was granted th'ouqn the
ETA , wiii..
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testimony ~r factual issues u:. wii* :h h e h a s knowledge, bi it, such, an
intermixture 01 testimony is not disqualify::

vneie, a s here, Mr. Keougn

19 both a designated witness of defendant, anc? 1 farmer o f * - - ? " ••"'tb
actual knowledge or reievant events. JLL A » « v«ixd argument that Cleaiune
need not b e bound b y far*- testimony o~ tcrir^ *or vtr ~h

u

~ - a - -ot

produced, b u t m e Court vi^es not conclude u«*t, a.** this deposition, n i .
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Keough testified factually and in his own behalf in a way contrary to his
testimony as ClearOne's voice. With respect to the 30(b)(6) designation,
the scope was set forth in the notice, and its language was sufficiently
broad to encompass the issues critical to this Court's inquiry regarding
the

parties'

intentions.

The

notice

referenced

"circumstances

surrounding" and *communications" regarding the engagement agreements.
In short, the Court concludes that while Mr. Keough's testimony may
not be pleasing to ClearOne, it neither outside the scope of the
deposition notice nor tainted by bias such that it may not stand as the
contemporaneous evidence of ClearOne's intentions when the engagement
letters weire negotiated and executed. Mr. Keough does paint himself as
something of a rubber stamp for decisions made by others, but those
others/who have not been designated, are also representatives of
ClearOne whose actions bind the defendant.
The Court also acknowledges ClearOne's argument that because Mr/
Marsden, an attorney, was the drafter of the engagement letters, they
should be construed against plaintiffs.

While it is true that an

attorney/draftsman must assume responsibility for ambiguities that cannot
be resolved> the Court determines (as it has previously indicated) that
the issue regarding construction against the drafter does riot come into
play unless and until the Court finds that it is impossible to determine
the intention of the parties from the document and the available
testimony.

In this case, the Court determines that there is no need to
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resort to the construction against draftsman rule, because the intentions
can be fairly gleaned from the documents and the additional evidence now
before the Court.
For the reasons stated, the Court notes that all of the evidence
available regarding the drafting and negotiation of the two engagement
letters is before the Court, and the Court finds that this evidence is
sufficient for the Court to determine, as a matter of law, the intentions
of the parties with respect to the letter agreements.
the first issue the Court addresses is the scope of the Bendinger;
Crockett letter of January 29, 2003. The first paragraph of that letter
states that the parties agree that Bendinger, Crockett will "represent
Susie Strohm' s interest in connection with the SEC civil Complaint,
referenced above, and in connection with further related investigations
and litigation." As of the date of execution of the agreement, there was
no formal criminal action underway, but the evidence clearly shows that
the day before the agreement was signed ClearOne was informed by a Utah
Assistant United States Attorney that the of f ice had commenced a criminal
investigation
stemming

targeting ClearOne, Frances Flood and Susie Strohm,

from

the

SEC

civil

action

identified

in

the

letter.

Furthermore, on January 31, 2003, just two days after the agreement was
signed, Bendinger, Crockett's billing to ClearOne included tasks related
to criminal liability and the Joint -.Defense' Agreement that was entered
into by the parties on February 7, 2003, and which Agreement was drafted
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by ClearOne-s counsel/ Clyde/ Snow, Sessions and Swenson.
The

Joint

Defense Agreement

recitals

refer

to

the

criminal

investigation and the fact that ClearOne was notified directly by the
United States Department of Justice that an investigation was underway,
in connection with the SEC action. The Joint defense Agreement further
recites that because of the existence of both the SEC action and the
Department of Justice criminal action, as well as certain investor suits,
the criminal attorneys anticipate further investigation and a need for
cooperation. The recitals indicate that the existence of the civil arid
criminal actions relate to or involve common issues and concerns of their
respective clients and that such clients have a mutuality of interest in
defending the proceedings.
All of the foregoing recitals, which are essentially contemporaneous
with the execution of the first engagement letter, are consistent with
the testimony of Mr. Keoxigh that he understood in 2002 and early 2003,
as CEO of ClearOne, that a Department of Justice investigation was
underway and that criminal litigation could result/This was knowledge
he possessed when he signed the first engagement letter, and the Court
finds that there is no reasonable dispute that the

u

in connection"

language in the first letter includes within its ambit the criminal
action that has become the focus of the present attorney's fee claim.
The

Court

also

recognizes

that

plaintiffs

have

identified

substantial extrinsic evidence supporting the other evidence, such as
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documents and Mr. Keough's testimony, to support the conclusion that
ClearOne intended to provide Ms. Strohm a full defense, civil and
criminal, and they intended to retain Mr. Marsden and his firm(s) for
that purpose. ClearOne has also identified extrinsic evidence, for the
contrary purpose, especially to argue that because Mr. Marsden was not
a recognized criminal lawyer, or was not principally so employed when the
letters were executed, ClearOne could not be deemed to have been
extending financial support for the criminal action. The Court finds that
plaintiffs' proffered evidence does indeed support the conclusion that
ClearOhe understand the nature of the representation, even if it is
likely that it did not recognize the degree of liability it may incur.
On the other hand; nothing in the evidence supports the view that Mr.
Marsden was so unidentified with criminal practice that his retention
requires a conclusion that the two letters did not contemplate criminal
defense.

/,,

In fact, in the Salt Lake

legal market, some of the best

practitioners may wear two or more hats. Indeed, Max Wheeler, who has
been cited in this case as the quintessential white collar criminal
lawyer, is also well known as a skilled litigator in complex commercial
matters, among others. There is noting anomalous about the roles assumed
in this case by Mr. Marsden or his colleagues.
The next point is that even if there was doubt regarding the
probability of criminal actions at the precise date of signing the first
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letter, such doubt would not be reasonable by the time the second letter
agreement was signed on March 31, 2004. For example, both the November
20, 2003, draft Employment Termination Agreement ("ETA") and the December
5, 2003, final version explicitly referenced

w

a grand jury investigation

being conducted by United States Department of Justice." The later date
was

still

almost

four

months

before

ClearOne

executed

the

Ddrsey

engagement letter.
Mr. Keough confirmed that he was aware of the ongoing grand jury
investigation at the time he signed the ETA.
would

suggest

ClearOne

did not have knowledge

The only testimony that
of, or appreciate

the

significance of the Department of Justice investigation at the time the
ETA was signed, or at the time the Dorsey & Whitney engagement letter was
signed on March 31, 2004, was the testimony of prior counsel Jefferson
Gross,

who

indicated

that

he

thought

the

Department

of

Justice

investigation had "died," but the evidence and the overall context make
it clear that Mr. Gross did not know that the investigation had been
terminated in any way, but was merely hopeful that lack of activity was
a

positive

sign.

In

addition,

the

testimony

referred

to

ClearOne's

knowledge in about fall 2003. Whatever that knowledge in fact was, the
draft and final ETA later in 2003 unequivocally identified the criminal
•...proceeding, •••.•;
^ A d d r e s s i n g the relationship of the two letters, some discussion has
occurred, prompted

in part by the Court's questions, whether the two
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letters are separate agreements, or whether together they comprise one
agreement. Following briefing and argument, and review of the testimony,
the Court determines that they can only be read together, to form one
agreement, the latter updating and supplementing the former. The single
biggest impetus for the second letter was Mr. Marsden's change of
employment. That change necessitated a modification to establish a
contractual relationship with Dorsey & Whitney.
The Dorsey & Whitney letter implicitly incorporated the terms of the
Bendinger/ Crockett letter, changing only those elements of the former
agreement that were specifically addressed. The Court determines that new
language that changed substantive rights and obligations may not be
applied retroactively; e.g. the Dorsey letter inclusion of interest at
18% may not be invoked before March 31, 2004, but the Court considers in
unlikely that any such claim will be made. On the other hand, the
contractual

claim

for attorney's

fees

incurred

in

enforcing

the

agreements was first included in the Bendinger, Crockett letter, and
shall apply to both agreements.
The next issue the Court considers, returning to the Bendinger,
Crockett letter initially, is the issue of reasonableness of fees and
extent of potential liability on the part of defendant. The underlying
events and criminal case have consumed many years, with the attendant
significant increase in attorney fee rates.

In addition, Mr. Marsden

moved from Bendinger, Crockett to Dorsey & Whitney in 2004.Bendinger,
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Crockett was a very well respected Salt Lake firm that has since merged
with a national firm, Howery, but in 2004 it was a local boutique
litigation firm.
Dorsey & Whitney, as a large national firm, generally charged
higher billing rates than were customary at Bendinger, Crockett, and the
Court would suggest customary in this community at that time.

In the

Bendinger, Crockett engagement letter, Mr. Marsden recites his rate at
$255 per hour, however, he also agrees to discount his rate by 10% under
the agreement.

The letter further recites that the rates are reviewed

and adjusted annually. The letter indicates that billings shall be based
on normal hourly rates for all employees of the firm who work on the
matter, but the Court determines that the reasonable intention of the
paxties to be drawn from the Bendinger, Crockett letter is that Milo
Steven Marsden, was the lead attorney, and that except in unusual
circumstances, his rate would be the highest rate.
Fee discussion in the Dorsey letter restates Mr. Marsden's rate of
$255 per hour, subject to adjustment, without reference to a discount.
The letter cohtaihs no specific recitation of fees for other Dorsey
lawyers or para-professionals. The Bendinger, Crockett letter provides
that •':*CIearOne will pay the full amount of our bill within thirty days
after receipt."

The Court cites these provisions for the sole purpose

of putting the parties on notice that a reasonable fee determinatidn is
within the sound discretion of the trial court, but the Court will be

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STROHM V. CLEARONE COMM.

PAGE 11

RULING AND ORDER

guided as much as possible by contract language, with the caveat that,
as discussed during argument, the payment "in full" language will not be
a factor determining a reasonable fee. The Court determines that the
provision for interest at 18%; however, is a contractual provision, that
is carried forward to the second letter agreement, and it is enforceable
unless determined to be unconscionable as a matter of law.

Knight

Adjustment Bureau v. Lewis/ 2010 UT App 40 (Feb. 19, 2010).
The final issue is whether Dorsey (the Court assumes that the
argument does not apply to Ms. Strohm, who is a party to this action, but
not appearing pro se) is precluded from recovering fees expended by its
lawyers to enforce the rights addressed herein under the rule laid down
i n Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah
1996). I have re-read the case, the memoranda and additional cases cited
in the memoranda. Plaintiffs suggest that (1) the rule stated does not
apply to the facts of this case, or (2) Dawson was wrongly decided by our
Supreme Court. Counsel will understand that if this Court can decide the
issue on the first rationale, it will do so.'
In fact, after considering the rule, the applicable cases, and
particularly the background of the Dawson case/ which drew considerable
attention when issued, I must agree with plaintiffs that the facts are
not close. Primarily, Dorsey may represent itself, but it also represents
Ms. Strohm, and everything that underlies this present action stems from
the lawyers representation of Ms. Strohm in a major criminal action.
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Next, Dorsey is not suing its client. The claim for fees incurred in
enforcing the payment or reimbursement rights arises from a contract
between Dorsey and Ms. Strohm and ClearOne. ClearOne is not a client, but
simply a third-party payer. The rights of Ms. Strohm under the applicable
agreement cannot be vindicated unless she has competent counsel to assert
those rights. This circumstance bears no resemblance to a case where a
law firm represents a client, charges a fee apparently well in excess of
an agreed cap, and more than the benefit received by the client, after
which the firm uses its power and expertise to enforce collectidn. The
Court concludes that Dawson does not preclude a fee award for the
contract enforcement action, but the same reasonableness analysis that
the Court will apply to the fees incurred in the criminal case will be
applied to any fee award for enforcement.
Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that plaintiffs'
Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to its Third Claim for
relief

(engagement agreement letters) be and hereby is GRANTED, as

follows: The Court finds that the two letters of January 29, 2003 and
March 31, 2004, together form an enforceabie contract, providing an
alternative basis to require defendant ClearOne Communications to pay
Susie Strohm's reasonable legal fees incurred in her defense of federal
criminal proceedings as previously identified in this action or to
reimburse her for fees paid to her counsel and co-plaintiff. The Court
reserves the issue of whether Ms. Strohm's fees should be allocated to
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account for the single Count on which she was convicted at trial.
Plaintiffs are also entitled to judgment for interest and fees incurred
in seeking recovery under the letter agreements. ClearOne's Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
Dated this 2nd day of March, 2010.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Ruling and Order, to the following, this

(?

2010:

Milo Steven Marsden
Cameron M. Hancock
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
136 S. Main Street, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
William Michael, Jr.
Surya Saxena
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
50 S. Sixth Street, Suite 1500
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402-1498
James E. Magleby
Jennifer Fraser Parrish
Attorneys, for Defendant
170 S. Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3605
Brian S. Cousin
Neil A. Capobianco
Attorneys for Defendant
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10018
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% » W5TRICT COURT

Third Judicial District
W i T U K e COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
''•putyCtortt

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUSIE STROHM and DORSEY &
WHITNEY, LLP,

RULING AND ORDER
CASE NOV 080917500

Plaintiff,
vs.
CLEARONE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Judge Robert K. Hilder
Defendant;

On

September

20 and 23, 2010, the -Court

heard

argument on

plaintiffs' Petition for an Award of Reasonable Attorney's Fees and'
Costs, and defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition
to Fees.

Plaintiffs were represented by Milo Steven Marsden, Cameron

Hancock and William Michael.

Defendant was represented by Brian Cousin

and Neil Capobianco. Following argument, the Court took the matter under
advisement.
submitted

Thereafter, on October
a

letter

and a

14, 2010, defendantl.s

Supplemental

Declaration

counsel

of Narasimhan

Narayanan, dated October 13, 2010, which provided evidence of the hourly
rates paid by ClearOne for all of its Salt Lake City-based attorneys and
para-professionals

since 2007.

Defendant's

counsel

also took the

opportunity to respond to cases cited by the Court at the September 23,
•2010/ hearing.:;;-;':

v';'-:"', /: •••••:^'':;':"•'.

On October 15, 2010, counsel for plaintiff objected to the letter
and the supplemental rates submiss;ion.

Because the Court did in fact
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reference several cases that were not included in either side's briefing,
the Court has considered the letter response addressing each case. With
respect to the Supplemental Declaration, while the Court agrees with
plaintiff that this submission exceeds the limited permission granted by
the Court to supplement the record with some rate information, on review
the Court finds that the rate information is such that while it is more
grist for the mill, it does not in fact change the Court's analysis or
•

•

.

•

•

•

.

conclusion. The information has been considered and given the weight it
should be accorded/in light of the limited context in which it is
presented.
DEFENDANT' S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court addresses herein the various arguments asserted in
defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant did not--Effectively- Terminate Dorsey & Whitney's \.
Representation on November 30, 2009, or Any Other Date
The Court indicated during oral argument that it rejected ClearOne's
argioment that the letter from ClearOne's counsel, dated November 30,
2009, effectively terminated Dorsey & Whitney's representation of Susie
Strohm.

The Court will briefly state its reasons herein.

While the

Dorsey engagement letter of March 31, 2004, does indeed include the
language that "we [Dorsey] will withdraw from representation upon your
request,/' ClearOne's; reliance upon that language as authority for
ClearOne's unilateral termination of Dorsey's representation of Susie
Strohm is misplaced,

The core problem with the termination attempt is

well stated in William Michael's letter of December 3, 2009: A>CiearOne
does hot havev and never has had, authority pursuant to the engagement
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letter to terminate Dorsey*s services.

That authority rests with our

client, Mr. Strohm."
While ClearOne is indeed a party to the engagement letter, and the
language regarding termination could have been better drafted, it is
nevertheless crystal clear from the letter that Dorsey represented Susie
Strohm, and ClearOne's role was as third-party payor for those services.
Noting prevents ClearOne from contesting the necessity or reasonableness
of fees charged, but construing the language as authorizing ClearOne to
unilaterally terminate the attorney-client relationship runs directly
counter to the very nature of that relationship and- further violates Rule
1.16(b), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.

In addition, even if the

termination was otherwise effective, Dorsey was probably not ethically
permitted to withdraw given the status of the case without leave of
• ' C o u r t . ' . . . .

•••=•'..'.•.';•.'•'••'

Utah Public Policy Does Not Prevent Enforcement of the Dorsev \
Engagement Agreement
Discussion of any public policy issue must be undertaken in light
of the basis upon which the Court is considering an award of attorney's.
fees,

In two prior Rulings, this Court has determined that (1) Susie

Strohm is entitled to mandatory indemnification under Utah Code Ann., §
i6-i0a-907, and (2) Ms... Strohm is entitled to reimbursement for her legal
; expenses •pursuant to the terms of the explicit engagement agreement (riow
deemed to be the two engagement letters construed together), which
created a binding cbntract between Ms. Strohm, ClearOne and Ms. Strohm' s
counsel, ultimately Dorsey & Whitney.-

.

In its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ClearOne seeks to
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interpose a standard of conduct prerequisite to indemnification and/or
reimbursement of Ms. Strohm's reasonable and necessary f ees.
ClearOne relies upon Utah Code Ann./ § 16--10a-902 (1) .
this

section

correctly, but subsection

-902

deals

To do so,

ClearOne cites
only with the

indemnification of directors of the corporation. Subsection -907, on the
other

hand,

entitled

"Indemnification

of

officers,

employees,

fiduciaries, and agents,"' applies to Ms. Strohm, and that section does
not include the explicit standard of conduct language.

It is true that

subsection -907 (3) states that the corporation may indemnify an officer
who is not a director "to a greater extent, if not inconsistent with
public policy," (emphasis added). But this general language does not
establish a standard of conduct threshold for officers that is not
otherwise expressly stated. This reading is consistent with the Official
Commentary, at 908, which states:
Section; 907(3) authorizes indemnification for officer
employees...who are not directors, but neither requires nor
prescribes standards for their indemnification and expressly ^;
states that their indemnification may be broader than the
• right of indemnification granted to directors....V In effect,
this leaves public policy determinations as to what are
permissible limits, in a particular case, to the courts.
This Court determines that there is, in fact, no absolute public
policy bar to ClearOne's; indemnification or reimbursement pi
Strohm's fees.
2009,

Susie

The Court recognized that in its Order of November 18,

determining

;

that

Ms.

Strohm-

was

entitled

to

mandatory

indemnification under Utah Code Ann., § 16-10a-903 and -907, but that
recovery is limited to "the proceeding or claim(s) with respect to which
[s]he has been successful.."

In that Ruling, the Court noted that MsV
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Strohm had successfully defended herself against seven of the eight
counts, or claims, alleged against her in the criminal proceeding.
This Court does not reject out of hand the possibility that a
partial conviction might in some cases defeat or substantially reduce a
fee award. For example, Ms. Strohm was charged with seven counts of
securities fraud.

These were very serious counts, and they suggested

conduct not in any way consistent with the best interest of the
corporation.

Had Ms. Strohm been convicted of one or more counts of

securities fraud, ClearOne's argument that public policy should bar
indemnification

or

reimbursement

of

fees

and

expenses

would have

considerable force. The one perjury conviction/ standing apart from the
securities fraud allegations, and coming later in time, does not carry
the same force or public policy concern. While the Court reiterates that
Ms. Strohm should not receive fees related to the single count upon which
she was convicted, this Court is persuaded that based on the overall;
success of her defense, and her complete vindication of ahy securities{
fraud charges, it would be inconsistent with both the indemnification
statutes for officers, and the engagement agreements, to allow ClearOne
to avoid both a statutory responsibility and a contractual obligation it
voluntarily incurred^ ;
ClearOne Does Not Have Any Present Obligation to Pay Fees And/Or Costs
Incurred bv Dorsev in Behalf of Ms. Strohm Following her Conviction on
the Single Periurv Count
Ms. Strohm has no present obligation to reimburse ClearOne for
fees and costs related to the perjury count- before conviction (see
following section) , even if the proportion attributable to that couht;^;^^"
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can be established. On the other hand, now that there has been a
conviction on the one count, from the date of that jury verdict
ClearOne shall not be held liable, at this time, to pay Ms. Strohm's
fees and expenses in the criminal case post-February 27, 2009, all of
which must be attributed to the perjury count. However, in the event
Ms. Strohm is ultimately exonerated on that sole count, her claim will
then arise for reimbursement for all reasonable and necessary fees and
expenses.
Indeed, ClearOne's counsel conceded as much in oral argument on
September 23, 2010: J
COURT:

If she [is] ultimately vindicated on appeal, do you
then say, okay, we're going- to step up and pay?

MR.COUSIN: Well, Your Honor, to me that's where the statutory
obligation comes in and you've already ruled on that.
So to me, if she goes up on appeal, and she wins a
reversal on the perjury charge, then why isn't she
eligible under statutory indemnification?
•:"'-':f v; ,'": v -.

Transcript at 17.

It does not follow from this decision that ClearOne is entitled
•

'

•

•

•

"

'

'

"

'

'

•

•

/

'

•

'

•

.

'

•

•

'

.

•

'

*

'

.

"

'

'

•

•

•

to a reduction of fees incurred in the civil collection case after the
'

'

'

'

'

'

.

•

•

'

•

'

•

•

'

*

•

.

.

•

*

•

•

'

'

•

'

•

'

•

'

•

•

•

'

'

•

•

.

conviction. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in the collection
case. They need not prevail on every claim, or to the full extent of
any claim, to be entitled tq,fees. Claims for which there is no legal
entitlement to fees, and which do not share common facts, may trigger ,
an obligation to allocate compensable versus non-compensable claims,
but as stated in following sections, the Court does not find these
exceptions are present.
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The Court's Reasonableness Determination is Limited to Fees and ;
Expenses Billed But Not Paid After March 31. 2008
ClearOne has argued that the Court's application of a
reasonableness determination should apply to all fees and expenses
incurred and billed, including those bills incurred through March 31,
2008 that were paid in substantial part. .ClearOne has provided a
helpful summary of all Dorsey invoices related to Susie Strohm's
criminal defense through July 14, 2010. The summary includes payments
made on billings for work done through March 31, 2008.

It is

undisputed that no payments have been made for work completed by
Dorsey & Whitney after that date.

It is also undisputed that of the

eleven bills submitted for what appears to be approximately a ten ;
month period, ClearOne paid four of those bills without any contest,
and they paid an ultimately agreed amount, which in some instances
reflected aVbill reduction, on the remaining seven invoices.

In other

words, ClearOne did not accept the bills without scrutiny, but after ;
going through a process of challengihg certain payments, ClearOne paid
either an adjusted amount or the original charges, and the Court does
not consider those billings to be at issue for purposes of this
Ruling.

\

'•••:%•'';'

."V-:'-"

The Court notes that the total deduction based on ClearOners

objection to certain fees and costs through March 31, 2008A was

y

$44,009.30 (the Court calculates the total amount billed as
$1,341,081.30, and ClearOne ultimately paid $1,297,072,00).The
deduction ampunts to 3.28%>.'•' The Court further notes that at page 8 of
CIearQhe'JS Memorandum in:Support of Gross Motion for Summary Judgment,
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ClearOne states that it has expended approximately $3.196 million in
fees and expenses on Ms. Strohm's behalf. While the Court has no
reason to doubt that the figures set forth in the calculation are
accurate, the total includes all payments made by ClearOne in behalf
of both Ms. Strohm and Francis Flood, her co-defendant and a director
of the corporation, through August 18, 2009.

A portion of the total

is about $224,000 paid to Bendinger, Crockett, Mr. Marsden's prior
firm, and it appears that there may be some payments listed therein to
Dorsey & 'Whitney before the date of commencement of the ClearOne .•••'./
summary in its Memorandum..
The Court does not agree with ClearOne that all amounts paid in
behalf of Ms. Strohm and her co-defendant, whether attorney's. fees or
costs, are necessarily payments for Ms. Strohm's benefit, although in
light of the Joint Defense Agreement, some of the payments undoubtedly
benefitted both defendants.The numbers the Court has used through,
March 31, 2008 apparently do not include all payments made to Dorsey &
Whitney, and perhaps none paid,to Bendinger, Crockett, but the Court
also notes that the indemnification and/or reimbursement obligations v
related to matters other than the; criminal prosecution, including the
SEC action. ;Based on everything presented by counsel for all parties,
the Court vis confident that its focus for the most part on billings
commencing April 1, 2008, and the amounts provided by counsel and et
forth in the record, is the appropriate determination in this action
forfees and expenses related to the criminal prosecution orily.
The Court's determination to limit scrutiny to post March 31,;
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2008 is further buttressed by the application of the voluntary payment
rule, addressed in the following section.
Voluntary Payment Rule
While the Court believes that the reasons already stated justify
its decision to not revisit the reasonableness of fees and costs
already paid by ClearOne, with the exception of a portion that may be
attributed to defense of the Perjury count, another basis exists in.
support of that determination.

That is, counsel for ClearOne

indicated on more than one occasion that there was in fact no legal
basis to-compel ClearOne to pay the fees and costs that it.has

:

expended; therefore, asserted ClearOne> plaintiff were fortunate that
ClearOne had made such payments voluntarily... The Utah Court of
Appeals has adopted the voluntary payment rule, albeit without much
explanation: Y'A person cannot recover back money which he has

; «

voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all of the facts, without
fraud., duress, or extortion in some form,"

:

Southern Title Guar. Co.

•v- Bethers, 761 P >2d 951, 955 (Utah App.1988) (quoting 66 Am. Jur .2d
'*' '•?«':l'••••'.•••••'•• •""':

Restitution) ,

This Court has previously determined that an appropriate
application of the voluntary payment rule requires at least some
inquiry whether the party making the payment had an intention to waive
his or her rights to recover. While the rule itself does not, contain
such a requirement/ courts have held that if in fact a payment was
made under protest, application of the rule would be against the
weight of authority;

Avianca> IncV v. Corriea, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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4709 (D.D'C. 1992).
While the Court is not expressly relying upon the voluntary
payment rule in this case, the only evidence of protest by GlearOne is
its objection to some of the invoices, but the ultimate payment of a
compromised amount suggests that at that time any protest was
withdrawn.

When ClearOne ultimately could not accept the charges, it

stopped paying fees altogether, and amounts .billed thereafter are the
principal subject of this Ruling. For the reasons stated herein, the
Court will not go back and determine the reasonableness of fees billed
through March 31/ 2008.
ClearOne is Not Entitled at This Time to Reimbursement of Fees
Previously Paid With Respect to Defense of the Periurv Charge
Fees and expenses already paid for defense of the perjury count
may be an exception to the foregoing determination, but ClearOne is
not entitled to a reimbursement of such fees and expenses incurred and
paid with respect to the single perjury count at this time.
so for a several reasons.

This is

First, the undertakings upon which ClearOne

relies are part of the Employment Termination Agreement("ETA"). The
fees being sought through this action are not expressly conditioned
upon that Agreement.

Nevertheless, the Court and parties have

:

referenced the ETA to aid determination of the intentions of the
parties to the engagement letter agreements, and the Court will do so
herein'. •• \

. • •;•'..

Second, ClearOne agreed to advance fees, and Susie Strohm agreed
to reimburse fees advanced if it was "ultimately adjudged that [she]
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did not meet the requisite standard of conduct./' (Emphasis added) In
seeking to enforce this provision, ClearOne does riot address the fact
that it ceased making advancements, and ultimately ceased reimbursing
the fees.

As a general rule, a party seeking to enforce a contract

must show that it has fulfilled all of its own obligations under the
contract. \
Third, fees incurred related to the perjury conviction could be
an exception to this portion of the ruling, if the agreements taken
together (including the ETA) clearly expressed the parties7 agreement
that upon trial court conviction of a charge, the reimbursement
provision of the ETA undertakings was triggered. The Court can reach
no such conclusion. Apart from the statutory statement that conviction
alone "is not, of itself, determinative that the [officer] did not
meet the standard of conduct described" in U.C.A. § 16-10a-902, the
ETA language also raises doubt. That is, the obligation to reimburse
is triggered when the officer is "ultimately adjudged that [she] did
not meet the requisite standard of conduct.
Briefly applying the language to the facts: (1) The only express
standard of conduct requirement is contained in the ETA. (2) The Court
has determined that public policy does not import a standard of
conduct requirement into the agreements or the statute that would bar
either statutory of contractual indemnification for an officer. (3)
The standard in the ETA requires "ultimate" adjudication. (4) A good
faith argument can be made that the jury conviction on February 27, .
2009,. is not the ultimate adjudication of guilt, let alone of breach
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of the standard of conduct, which may be a discrete determination.
This is so because the conviction was vigorously challenged in both
post-trial motions, and now on appeal, and even an ultimate conviction
is not solely determinative. Accordingly, ClearOne's claim for
reimbursement for fees paid and attributable to the perjury count is
denied, but without prejudice to renewal following ultimate
adjudication.
The Agreement Interest Rate of 18% is Not Unconscionable
The Court has previously determined that the interest rate on
past-due attorney'' s fees and costs set forth in the original
Bendinger, Crockett engagement letter remained in force upon execution
of the Dorsey & Whitney engagement letter, dated March 31, 2004.
ClearOne now challenges that interest rate as unconscionable under
Utah law.

:

ClearOne raises challenges under both procedural and

substantive uhconscionability standards/The Court rejects both.The
procedural argument appears to rely heavily on ClearOne's position
that its then recently appointed CEO/ Michael Keough, xvwas without
bargaining power, was not a member of the Board of Directors,; and
believed that he was not free to negotiate the terms of the retaining
of Mr. Marsden." -Mr. Keough did testify in his deposition that to
some degree he was a rubberstamp, but ClearOne ignores the reality
that if Mr, Keough did in fact lack power, it was not because of any
actions by DQrsey * Whitney or Susie Strohm.

In fact, any limitations

on Mr. Keough's power to negotiate regarding the interest rate/ or any
other terms of the Agreement, assuming they existed at all, derive
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from limitations placed upon him by the ClearOne Board of Directorsv
It is a novel argument for a corporate entity to claim that it was
disadvantaged in negotiation because its governing board either
appointed an inexperienced CEO as negotiator/ or deliberately limited
the CEO's authority.

The Court rejects this argument.

With respect to substantive unconscionability, 18% interest is an
extremely common interest rate in collection matters in the state of
Utah.

Utah does not have a usury law, and much higher rates are

charged and enforced on a daily basis. The Court understands that
Utah's "legal rate" for prejudgment interest of 10% is substantially
lower than 18%, but that rate is simply a default rate in the event
the parties fail to contract for a rate.

In this case, two ostensibly

sophisticated parties negotiated an interest rate that is standard in
collection contracts/ including for attorney's fees, within this ,
community.

There is no basis for the Court to reject the agreement

the parties made for themselves.
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiffs Are the Prevailing Parties in This Civil Action for
Enforcement of the Right to Fees and Costs, and as Such They Are
Entitled to Reasonable Fees and Costs Incurred in This Action
;,

Based '"pit the Court's other decisions in this case, there is no

question that plaintiff Dorsey & Whitney and Susie Strohm are the
prevailing parties in this action. While the concept of prevailing
party has some flexibility^ under any measure plaintiffs have *
prevailed in this case, thus triggering the right to fees and costs:
incurred in this action as set forth in 'the engagement agreements•
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In Utah, an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party must be
authorized by statute or contract. See e.g. Doctorsf Co. v. Drezga,
2009 UT 60, 1 32,

and Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, I

23 (citing Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52; 54 (Utah 1998)). Both are in
play here, and the underlying legal right to fees and costs has been
decided in plaintiffs' favor. Generally, though, "the fact that a
party may ultimately ^prevail' in litigation does not necessarily
entitle that party to recover all of its attorney's fees incurred from
the outset of the litigation." Flying J Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc.,
2007 U.S| Dist. LEXIS 84554, *39 n.16 (D, Utah Nov. 15, 2007), aff'd
by 322 Fed. App'x 610, 617 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). Brookside
Mobile Home Park v. Sporl, 2000 UT App 195 (Mem, Decision) (citing
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988), Rappleve
v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 266 (UT App1993) arid Martindaie v. Adams,
777 P.2d 514,

517-18 (Utah App 1989))> In short,^w^

fees are usually mandatory, the Court may exercise discretion in the
amount.-awarded. •
: To determine a reasonable award of attorney fees and costs the
Court does not measure reasonableness by what the prevailing attorney
actually bills in the case. See Cabrera v. Cottreil, 694 P.2d 622, 624
(Utah 1985).; Rather/ the Court considers the following factors:
1.;
:".'•", 2.

^hat legal work was actually performed?
How much of the work performed was reasonably
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?

- ;3t ; .Is the attorney1s billing rate consistent with
the rates customarily charged in the locality for
similax services? .'
'•-••'• •.•"\ ,

:'• •'. •V:-.'^",:V:.v- • •'" _.;•••;•. ;r •••\;; v - V ^ ;'.';:,/•- 1 4

•••.'•.. '\ .:.;,/;- ; C/ viv'-.:.
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'" ;

4.

Are there circumstances which require
consideration of additional factors, including
those listed in the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 990 (citations omitted).
Application of the Reasonableness Factors
Work performed and its necessity (factors 1 and 2). The billings
are voluminous, in both cases. Except for broad attacks, such as
ClearOne's suggestion, addressed below, that only forty percent of the
work done by plaintiffs in the collection case addressed compensable
claims, there is little detailed critique of the work done. The Court
finds no rational basis to secondguess line after line of charges
billed by seasoned counsel, who were engaged in the criminal case in
defending complex and very serious charges that imperilled the
client's liberty and reputation, especially in light of the overall
excellent result. The collection case was less complex in this Court's
view, but it was aggressively defended throughout, with no quarter
given, and numerous motions and arguments urged, then urged again, by
counsel who in fact billed sums approaching those billed by :
plaintiffs. And for the most part, plaintiffs prevailed.
In the criminal case, ClearOne insists that to the extent Susie
Strohm incurred a greater defense bill with Dorsey than Francis Flood
incurred with Snow, Christensen & Martirieau, Ms. Strohm's fees are
likely excessive, both in work;done and rates charged. Rates are;
addressed below, but the challenge to the work done is top simplistic,
and it also ignores or unreasonably discounts the division of labor
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between the firms. The evidence before the Court is unrebutted that
Dorsey & Whitney, with its greater resources and experience in this
area took the laboring oar in document review and management,
preparation of witness kits and trial exhibits, and similar work, the
fruits of which were shared with Snow, Christensen & Martineau under
the Joint Defense Agreement. As expensive as this defense has been to
the parties, the Court's only reasonable conclusion is that but for
the Joint Defense Agreement and the division of labor that occurred,
the cost may well have been considerably higher.
ClearOne also complains about continuances in the criminal case.
Continuances do in fact increase the cost of a lawsuit, but they are a
sadly unfortunate feature in both civil and criminal cases. There
certainly are times when the request for a continuance unnecessarily
increases expense, but in this case one of the continuances resulted
at least in part from ClearOne's termination of payment of fees and
expenses necessary for trial preparation.
Billing rates. The standard is that the attorneyfs billing rate
must be consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality
for similar services. ClearOne attacks Dorsey's rates with vigor, and
while the Court agrees that some rate reductions are in order,•
Dorsey's rates are not seriously out of step with rates'that prevail
in the Salt Lake legal community, particularly when the Court examines
rates from the most critical years; namely, 2008 to the present.;
A simple comparison of either work done by Dorsey & Whitney and
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, or their respective hourly rates is:
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generally unhelpful to the court in either the criminal or the
collection case. ClearOne challenges the reasonableness of the fees
incurred in the defense of Ms. Strohm on a number of bases.

One is

the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged by the Dorsey & Whitney
attorneys/ and as primary evidence in support of this challenge,
ClearOne emphasizes the hourly rates of the Snow, Christensen &
Martineau attorneys who represented M s . Flood.

The Court certainly

considers the rates charged at Snow, Christensen & Martineau in this
case as an important item of evidence of a reasonable rate, but it is
only one piece of evidence.
point .

:',;'•:

The Court analyzes hourly rates at this
:'

.

' ':';./.•/'.

First, Dorsey identifies nine timekeepers

(eight lawyers and one

paralegal) who together account for 92% of Dorsey's billed time in
both cases. The Court specifically addresses the rates of these
timekeepers, and extrapolates a comparable reduction for the ; remaining
eight percent of billed time. The rates cover up to: three relevant
time periods: Two rate periods, April 1, 2008 to October
(rate # 1 ) , and October 2008 to present

[1] 2008; •

(rate # 2 ) / e f f e c t i v e l y

address all timekeepers, except Mr. Michael, who increased his rate on
October 2009, to present

(rate # 3 ) . The Dorsey personnel are;

addressed herein from highest billable rate, to the lowest, with city
of residence shown: .'••••'••'•••'.•.•
WILLIAM MICHAEL, JR.
Bar 1985

;

Rate # 1
Rate # 2

/ Rate # 3

CHRISTOPHER SHAHEEN
Rate # 1
:\--\y;\B^/-.19Bt
/ Rate # 2

$515
$575

Minneapolis

$615 .-v
$475
Minneapolis
$525 ''^./:y:]y: (\
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M. STEVEN MARSDEN
Bar 1986

Rate # 1
Rate # 2

$360
$375

Salt Lake

CAMERON HANCOCK
Bar 1988

Rate # 2

$340

Salt Lake

SURYA SAXENA
Bar 2004 ;

Rate # 1
Rate # 2

$270
$310

.Minneapolis

SCOTT CUMMINGS
Bar 2005

Rate # 2

$280

Salt Lake
!

JENNIFER GARNER
Bar 1989

Rate # 1
Rate # 2

$255
$285

Salt Lake

CRAIG KLEINMAN
Bar 1999 ; /

Rate # 1
Rate # 2

$245
$265

Salt Lake

SONYA RUSSELL
Paralegal 1993
.

, Rate .,# 1 $115
Rate # 2 $120

Salt Lake .:

Addressing these timekeepers in the order listed, Mr. Michael was

lead criminal counsel, and he also had a substantial role in the
collection case. His rate # 1 of $515 per hour (effective 2007) has
been proposed by plaintiffs as a possible compromise for the entire
criminal and collection calculation, but ClearOne has argued for
substantially lower rates. The argument that the highest rate for
Show, Christensen lawyers should cap all Ddrsey rates is not
persuasive. As the Court stated during-argmnerit, the Snow, Christensen
rates are arguably too low, particularly those of Mrv Wheeler and Mr.
Van Wagoner. Even if the Snow, Christensen rates >were a determinative
measure in some respects, this Court is persuaded that Mr. Michael's
skill, experieiice^and results in this case-persuasively place him in
the upper echelon of criminal lawyers handling complex securities
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matters.''

••.••.•'•••••.•;,-•

Fair comparisons to Mr. Michael, in the Salt Lake legal
community, include James Jardine
Jordan

(Ray, Quinney & Nebeker) and David

(Stoel, Rives). Record evidence at comparable times include

billing rates for both of $450 in 2008-2009. Ray, Quinney rates
increased about 5% in 2009, but at that time Mr. Jardine had started a
three year leave. In the same time frame, an unnamed Ray, Quinney
shareholder billed as high as $650. Plaintiffs' expert David Greenwood
provided an affidavit in support of Dorsey rates. He validated both
the selection of highly skilled specialist, and the reasonableness of
Dorsey rates in both c a s e s . I n his first affidavit, Mr. Greenwood
disclosed that his rate was higher than the $515 charged by Mr.
Michael I n 2007.
Mr. Marsden's rates exceed the $255 per hour quoted in the 2003
and 2004 letter agreements, and the first letter promised a ten
percent discount, which was provided in early billings,, apparently
related to the SEC case. ClearOne attempts, to use the quoted rate as a
cap for Dorsey rates, but that effort fails. First, both letters make
it clear that Mr,.'• Marsden r s rates

(his and his respective f irm' s) were

adjusted yearly, or subject to change. Second, while plaintiffs argue,
and the Court has agreed, that the specter of criminal proceedings was
known to GlearQne from the beginning, the ultimate form and complexity
was not known. It was a matter of professional responsibility for
Dorsey to staff the case as it evolved, with the lawyers best able to
represent M s , Strohm. There can be little argument that Mr. Michael
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was an appropriate choice. Mr* Michael's time shall all be calculated
at $515 per hour.
Second, the rates at issue in this proceeding started to accrue
in 2008, five years after Mr. Marsden quoted his initial rate. Both
the evidence and the Court's substantial knowledge of billing rates in
this community support the conclusion that rates increased
significantly over'this time. That Mr. Marsden's rates remain
comparable to his peers, or even a little lower, is shown by record .
evidence. As the Court stated during argument, one easily identified
peer of Mr. Marsden's, in both years of experience and skill, is Mark
Bettilypn. In 2008 Mr. Bettilyon's rate was $400 per hour.

In 2009 it

increased to $420 per hour. Numerous lawyers of similar or less
experience than Mr. Marsden, identified in the record, bill in the
range of $350 to $380 per hour. In contrast, Mr. Marsden's highest
rate in this case is $375, Mr. Marsden's time shall be awarded at his
rate # 1 , $360 per hour.

'

Mr. Hancock is also an experienced and very able lawyer. His rate
of $340 is consistent with that experience, and shall be applied to ;
all of his time. Mr. Shaheen is a Minneapolis partner, of apparent
skill and experience. In Minneapolis his rate is undoubtedly
appropriate, but applying the local standard, the Court determines^
that his rate shall be adjusted to $400 per hour for air time, to more
closely resemble his Salt Lake peers.

'"•••".{.

Ms. Garner's rate is-commensurate with her years of experience,
but in light of the fact that her role in this case entailed less
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responsibility than her senior colleagues., her rate shall be awarded
at $250 per hour for all time billed. Mr* Cummings is a relatively .
junior lawyer, and consistent with his experience level, his rate>
shall be reduced to $220 per hour.
Craig Kleinman, with more than ten years of experience in Salt
Lake, shall be billed at $230 per hour. Surya Saxena, a Minneapolis
associate with an experience level just a little more extensive than
-Mr. Cummings's, shall be billed at $230 per hour. •
Addressing Ms. Russell, the Court finds that despite ClearOne's
argument to the contrary, all paraprofessional rates for Dorsey;
employees in both Minneapolis and Salt Lake are well within the Salt
Lake reasonable fee range, as attested to by, among other measures,
Snow, Christensen's paralegal rates. No adjustment shall apply to
para-professionals.
For all other Dorsey lawyers, whose time comprises a relatively
low percentage of either billing, the Utah lawyer rates will remain as
billed, and the Minneapolis lawyers rates shall be reduced to the rate
that best approximates the rates of Utah Dorsey lawyers with similar
experience levels> based on bar admission dates, which rates have been
determined by the Court in this section.
Consideration of additional factors. A number of other factors.
should be addressed at~ this point; Discussion of ^each follows:,
;

; Expenses, '•Including' Travel and Lodging Expenses for Out-of-State
Counsel Are Generally Reasonable Under the Circumstances
(Both Cases) ;-',:
ClearOne understandably argues that if Susie Strohm used only
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Salt Lake-based attorneys, then there would not be a need for much of
the travel and lodging expenses that are included in the Dorsey &
Whitney billings, The problem with the argument is that ClearOne
agreed to fund all reasonable and necessary expenses, and they did not
place any restrictions on the identity or geographic location of
counsel, neither should they.

The choice of counsel decision is

clearly reserved for the client.

ClearOne is not the client.

As a sophisticated corporation, represented by counsel, ClearOne
is charged with the knowledge that in the present day legal market,
much of the most sophisticated work is carried out through regional,
national and international law firms.

It is expected that however the

legal services are delivered, the firm in question will assign the
best-suited lawyers and para-professionals, regardless of where they
are located.

It is also expected that where appropriate, work is done

at lower billing rates. While the Court addresses billing rates in
this Ruling and Order, it does not see a legitimate .basis either on •
general terms, or under the facts of this case, to secondguess the
assignment'--of specific counsel, regardless of where those counsel are
• l o c a t e d - . ::••:''•'•,:'•,-:/'•.•:'•.:/••

•[•:'•:.•:.•:.":::

The Court; again notes that it is fully,persuaded that lead
criminal counsel, William Michael, Jr., was eminently qualified for
the task, and the results speak for themselves.

Short of a specific

agreement or express provision that counsel should limit or completely
avoid billing the lodging and travel costs, the Court is unwilling to
apply such cuts to the billed amounts. The Court does, however, agree

2 2

••••'
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that in the specific context of travel time/ careful scrutiny is
necessary to insure that the billing is fair, *
The Court considers two sides to the inquiry regarding travel
time.

Travel time that does not include any preparation or related

work done in behalf of this client is arguably of less value to the
client.

On the other hand, travel time that is not available to the

lawyer for work for any other client is ultimately a cost to the
lawyer, a cost that is imposed

only because of his or her engagement

on this client's business.
This Court determines that a reasonable accommodation of these
concerns is as follows: For all travel time billed and described a&
travel and preparation, no deduction to the bill should be applied.
For travel time billed without any description that includes ;
preparation or work on the case, Dqrsey is directed to apply a 25%
reduction.

The application of this directive shall be applied to the

bills containing charges post-March 31, 2008/ as they have been ; •
presented up to this time. That is, Dorsey is instructed it shall not -r
go back and now identify support that might change the descriptions. ";:\:
At this point in the case, the Court determines that the parties need
to live with the existing submissions.

There will be no reductions

for lodging and related expenses charged in Salt Lake or in any other
area where counsel had to travel to discharge their responsibilities
to Ms. Strohrri.
Travel expenses: were a substantial portion of all expense (cost) \
claims. The fourth
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further detailed examination of costs to seek cuts. Accordingly, ...
except for the travel adjustment set forth in this section, all
requested expenses in both cases shall be av/arded.
Block Billing
(Criminal Case)
ClearOne has also raised some concerns about the adequacy of
records provided.

The Court notes that initially ClearOne;agreed to

accept block billings, but regardless the Court has reviewed the
billing records produced, and finds that they are adequate under
general billing standards, and the Court will apply no reduction based
on any purported inadequacy of the billing records.

:

,

Reasonableness of Fees for This Civil Collection Case
In addition to the Court's determination of reasonable and
necessary fees incurred in the criminal defense of Ms. Strohm, the
Court must determine a reasonable fee in this collection case. The
billing rates"for all Dorsey professipnals and para-professionals
' :• ' V/':V_;:. • / •.• .

shall be as set forth above.

The Court has already determined that the prevailing party in
this civil case is entitled to reasonable fee? and expenses*

Based on

this Ruling and Order, if there was any doubt regarding the prevailing
party/regardless of the theory employed, there can be none now.
Plaintiffs have prevailed and are entitled to fees pursuant to the
explicit language of.the engagement" agreements*

The factors the Court

considers have been addressed above.
.There

is no doubt that the fees claimed by plaintiff for

24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

enforcement of the right to reimbursement or indemnity are very
':

V

V
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••••;

substantial.

•

;
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••.".•"
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:

.

' ' " :

•

The total fee claim before the Court on the civil matter

is $1/088,145.74 comprised of $1,021,093.25 in attorney's fees and
$67,052.49 in costs. The attorney's fees will be reduced in an amount
to be calculated based on the rate adjustments above.
The Court must consider whether all of the fees incurred were in
fact necessitated by work on compensable claims. A party may not be
entitled to fees it charged to prevail on certain claims where that
work substantially overlaps with the fees charged for pursuing
unsuccessful claims.See Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, % 129
(upholding the trial court's finding that a prevailing party was hot
entitled to all fees where the trial court found there was "not a core
of facts common to all claims, and the legal theories [were] . . .
unrelated. . :... . [and where] not only was some of the time spent on
unsuccessful issues, a large portion of time was spent establishing
the non-compensable claims.").Because a party may only recover fees
associated with the claims on which it prevailed:
[A] party seeking fees must allocate its fee request
according to its underlying claims. Indeed, the party must \
-categorize the time and fees expended for \(1) successful
claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney
fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have
been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement ,. .to" attorney fees.'
</..:.// '•
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002- UT 68, 1 56 (internal
citations omitted)r
A Court '"may not award whplesale all attorney fees requested if
they have not been allocated as to separate claims and/or parties...'"
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Id. (citation omitted); see also Keith Joraensen1s. Inc. v. Oaden City
Mali Co.. 2001 UT App 128, 1 32 (stating XV[1]fa party fails to
properly apportion attorney fees, a trial court may deny that party's
fee request."). "[A] prevailing party may collect attorney fees on
noncompensable claims only if those claims substantially overlap with
compensable claims. " Jensen, at f 130 (citing Keith Joraensen1s. Inc.
v. Oaden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, X 30).If the separation is
possible, the party claiming the fees has the burden of allocating
fees charged, and failure to do so can result in a denial of all fees.
ClearOne suggests that no more than 40% of the fees charged on
the collection case relate to compensable claims.

The Court finds the

argument, the expert's report, and the supporting Declaration of Neil
A. Capobianco to be unpersuasive.

It is true that this litigation

involved allegations based on the Employment Termination Agreement,
statutory '•'•indemnification' provisions, the engagement agreement, and
equitable claims•; The award being considered at this time is based •:
almost exclusively on the engagement agreement
indemnification provisions of Utah law.

statutory

Of course, the actual basis

for the award is limited to those two sources, but it would be
incorrect to suggest that the Court has not had to consider the ETA
and its provisions in reaching its determinations.; Accordingly, to
the extent the work done has addressed any of the'agreements or
statutes at issue, the work is compensable*
The equitable theories are a little more in doubt. ".' There is no
question that the equitable theories were reasonable alternative
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theories to pursue, but in fact the prevailing arguments are all based
on statute or contract.

The difficult question is how to ascertain

the amount of time spent on equitable theories that did not ultimately
prevail.

The Court's view in this case., is that much of the work done

regarding the equitable theories was in fact closely interrelated with
the work done regarding the successful theories including,
specifically,; discovery.

Beyond that area, there was in fact not much

work expended, on pursuing the equitable theories, certainly not after
the Court's initial ruling on mandatory indemnification, and its later
Ruling ^regarding the engagement, agreement.

Based on this assessment, •':..';••

the Court agrees that there should be ah overall reduction, but that
reduction should be limited to 5% of the total fees and costs claimed
by plaintiff, which 5% shall be applied to the fees and costs
recalculated based on the hourly rates allowed herein.
; The Court concedes that at some level it is troubled by the
overall costs of this litigation, but this Court does not set market
rates.

Its function is merely to consider what is a reasonable rate

in light of the existing market, and one factor in considering an
overall reasonable fee in this collection case is the amount of fees
charged by ClearOne's counsel. The Court does not have benefit of
detailed billing statements, and the Court recognizes that ClearOne's
counsel are based in New York City, one of the highest billing
locations in the country.

Moreover, ClearOne's counsel's rates are

not to be scrutinized under the Salt Lake market standard, because the
Court is not making any award in favor of ClearOne.

Nevertheless, it
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is informative to the Court that ClearOne has billed approximately
$740,000 in this civil case since its inception.

One conclusion to be

drawn from that information is that no matter how much concern this
Court may have with such vast expenditures on what is essentially a
collection case, albeit a complicated and aggressively fought case,
plaintiffs7 claim, particularly when reduced to reflect the rates
allowed by the Court, is reasonable.
Plaintiffs also seek interest on the fees and costs at the rate
of 18% from and after June 29, 2010, until paid. See.the following
ruling addressing prejudgment interest.
Finally, the Court expressly imposes August 10, 2010, the date of
the last services billed in the collection case (invoice date
September 3, 2010) before argument on the motions decided herein. In *
proceedings to enforce attorney/s fees and costs provision, the ever
accruing charges must stop at some point. The Court recognizes that
additional work has been done, mostly preparatibn for argument and two
hearings, but the Court deems it an unwise practice to entertain portargument and submission billings, which themselves must be examined
for reasonableness, a practice which can only delay final
adjudication.

:;

*-•-'.' -'•••'r< '"••/
Prejudgment Interest •

Plaintiffs request prejudgment interest at 18% on both the fees
awarded for defense of the criminal case, and any fees awarded in
connection with plaintiffs' prosecution of the collection case.
Plaintiffs' support for such an expansive right to prejudgment
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interest is stated succinctly: "[p]ursuant to this Court's March 2,
2010 Ruling and Order." Milo Steven Marsden Declaration, June 30,.
2010, at 20. It is probably the Court's fault, but plaintiffs read
these few words too expansively.
In fact, the Court ruled, "the provision [in the first letter
agreement] for interest at 18%; however, is a contractual provision,
that is carried forward to the second letter agreement, and it is
enforceable unless determined to be unconscionable as a matter of
law." Ruling at 11 (citation omitted). And a few pages later:
"Plaintiffs are also entitled to judgment for interest and fees
incurred in seeking recovery under the letter agreements." Ruling at
13;. •

: '"'.; :::\':\'\''y^\/-,X-'Z

';'A-:'••;''''' \V^-".'

•'"•'. .:; :.'-;

The second sentence certainly could have been better drafted.
Perhaps "Plaintiffs are also entitled to judgment for interest [on
unpaid fees under the letter agreements] and fees incurred in seeking
recovery [in the collection action]

under the^letter agreements." The

point is that the- sentence was never intended to prejudge whether
plaintiffs are entitled to interest on unpaid fees, plus fees incurred
in the collection case> and interest on fees subsequently awairded in
the;collection case.
In any event, while the parties have argued the interest rate
issue; that is, unconscionability, the briefing does not raise the
issiie of whether prejudgment interest is appropriate on the fees on
the collection case. Again, this oversight probably results from the
Court's ambiguous, at best, statement, but the issue must be
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addressed.
Interest dn a fee award presents an unusual analytical task, and
in this case the Court determines that while prejudgment interest, at
18%, is awardable on the fees incurred and billed in the criminal
defense, as adjusted herein, no prejudgment interest should be awarded
on the fees determined by the Court in the collection case.
The determination of entitlement to prejudgment interest is a
question of law, reviewed by the appellate court for correctness.
Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App. 5, f 24/ 994 P.2d 817, 822 (citing
Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)) . Thus/ the trial
court may not exercise discretion on this important question. Since
1907, Utah courts have awarded prejudgment interest in cases where
"damages are complete,"and where they can be measured by "fixed rules
of evidence and known standards." Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., •
32 Utah 101 (1907) (cited in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT
41, 1 17, 82 P.3d 1064, 1068.
General language in cases not addressing interest on a fee award
is of limited assistance, but articulation of the purpose behind an
award of prejudgment interest is helpful:' "Prejudgment interest is
awarded *to compensate a party for the depreciating value of the•'.}••'..•'•
amount owed over time and, as a corollary, [to] deter[] parties from
intentionally withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing.'"
Leifavi, 2000 UT App 5, f 24, 994 P.2d 817, 822-23 (citations omitted),
See also, Carlson Dist. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., 2004 UT
App 227, \

32, 95 P.3d 1171, 1179. i
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•\:"'^'\/-'Th±B language suggests, to this Court, a distinction between
entitlement to prejudgment Interest in the criminal defense and the
collection case. In the former, every month ClearOne had an invoice,
and a certain sum was claimed. Timely payment was promised by
contract, and if payment was not made, an agreed interest rate
applied. ClearOne had it in its power to avoid an interest charge
following an adverse adjudication by paying under protest, and seeking
an adjusti»ent in this collection case, or in a case ClearOne might
have filed. In the later matter, this collection case, the fees,
particularly their reasonableness, were unknown until this Ruling and
Order. Prejudgment interest on attorneys fees cases typically disallow
such interest.
As of 1994, there were apparently only three Utah cases
addressing the specific issue, and the latest case; makes a good . ., .
argument that the other two cases are not much help. In James
Constructors/ Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation; 888 P.2d 665
(Ut.App. 1994)/ the court decided the issue of whether prejudgment
interest may be awarded when the entitlement is provided by contract,
but the ^ultimate determinatipn of the reasonableness of the fees is
left to a factfinding court." ]^i. at $72. The answer was no, but this
Court finds the facts and the issue in' the present case
distinguishable'^;-.That is, the letter agreements require payment in full of the
billed amount, on time, of interest applies. A later dispute over both
entitlement and reasonableness may well change the ultimate" obligation

3 1

•••>••
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of the party that agreed to pay fees, but to the extent the billed
fee, or a portion of it as determined by the Court, is found to be
owed, it is illogical that the obligor should avoid the contractual/
interest by refusing to pay anything under the agreement.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that prejudgment
interest does not apply to the fees awarded in the collection case.
For fees awarded post-March 31, 2008, in the criminal case/
prejudgment interest applies to each invoice billed post-March 31,
2008, at the contractual rate of 18%, with each invoice to accrue

:

interes t on the adj usted amount provided* herein from the date on which
It would have become due under the contract. Accordingly, Dorsey must
complete a couple of tasks: adjusting each invoice consistent with
this Ruling on billable rates, and calculating interest based on the
adjusted invoice, from the date interest accrues until judgment, after
which date interest shall accrue at 18% on the criminal case fees and
costs, ;

/''•'•••'••••:.•'••'.'.'..•;','•."''..•'.

..'.-•

•.'•'••

The letter agreements do not include an interest provision that
applies to the collection case. The contractual rate applies only to
amounts billed in the criminal case, and unpaid after thirty days.
Accordingly/ the collection case fees awarded herein shall bear no
prejudgment interest, but the entire collection case fees and expense
judgment shall accrue post-judgment interest at,the 2011 statutory •
rate of 2)*3% until the judgment is paid.

;;

: '

•;•:•'••••;:. A number or orders are stated in the foregoing Ruling. The Court
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summarizes those orders at this point, but the detail included above
is incorporated into this Order:
1.

Defendant ClearOneVsx\Cross-*Motion for Summary judgment is

DENIED.'2.

.'.' •" '•

. "/

Plaintiffs1 petition for an Award of Reasonable Attorney's

Fees and Costs is GRANTED for both the criminal defense case, and for
fees and costs incurred in this collection case, as follows:
/a.

In the criminal defense matter, Ms. Strohm and her counsel,
Dorsey & Whitney, are awarded all hours and expenses billed
and paid by ClearOne through and including the invoice that

,'••/•'; closed on March 31, 2008, with no retrospective adjustment
or reimbursement.;.;'
b * I n

the criminal defense matter, commencing April 1, 2008,

Ms., Strohm and Dorsey are awarded all hours billed through
V.'.V and including February 27, 2009, the date on which the
federal jury verdict was returned convicting M s . Strohm of,
one count; namely/ perjury* The billed hours are to be
recalculated by plaintiffs applying the hourly rates set
forth in the foregoing Ruling. Plaintiff$' are also awarded
all expenses billed through February 27, 2009, in the
amounts billed with the sole exception of an adjustment to
/travel time (for M r , Michael or any other Dorsey timekeeper)
cohsistent with this Ruling regarding travel expenses.
:

c.;

In the criminal matter, Dorsey is awarded pre judgment
interest at the contract rate of 18% 7 simple interest, /
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commencing 30 days after the first invoice post-March 31,
2008, which invoice is dated May 22, 2008 through the
ultimate date of the Judgment to be entered consistent with
this Ruling, and Order. Interest on each succeeding invoice
shall be awarded commencing thirty days after the date of-,
each respective invoice* When judgment is entered, the full
judgment amount shall continue to bear 18% simple interest,
until paid.
In the criminal matter, fees and expenses billed commencing
February 28, 2009, are not awarded at this time, but final
determination of any award from February 28, 2009, through
completion of the criminal case shall await the ultimate
adjudication of Ms. Strohm's guilt on the perjury count,
whether on appeal, or on remand, should that occur. The
Cqurt specifically retains jurisdiction too address that
issue should Ms. Strohm. be .-'ultimately adjudicated not guilty
..of- all charges.
In this collection case, Ms. Strohm and Dorsey, as

v

prevailing parties, are awarded all fees and expenses billed
through August 10,2010, subject to the same hourly rate and
travel expense adjustments the Court has required with
respect to the criminal defense billings, and further
subject to the five percent deduction imposed by the Court
to address work and expenses done to pursue unsuccessful
claims or theories.
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3.

Plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare a final Judgment

consistent with this order, which judgment shall be submitted to the
Court after defendant's counsel have the time required by Rule 7, Utah
R. Civ* P., to approve or submit any objections to the Judgment.
Dated this 24th day of January, 2011.
By the

Robea
District Court Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Ruling and Order, to the following, this & 1
January, 2011:

Milo Steven Marsden
Cameron M. Hancock
DORSEY & WHITNEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 S. Main Street, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
William Michael, Jr.
Surya Saxena
DORSEY & WHITNEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 S. Sixth Street, Suite 1500
Minneapolis, Minnesota 554 02-14 98
James E. Magleby
Jennifer Fraser Parrish
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD
7
Attorneys for Defendant
170 S. Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3605
Brian S. Cousin
Neil A. Capobianco
SEYFARTH SHAW
Attorneys for Defendant
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10018
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN - 8 2011
SALT U K E COUNTY

Milo Steven Marsden (#4879)
Cameron M. Hancock (#5389)
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
136 South Main, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 933-7360
Facsimile: (801) 933-7373

ay.
William Michael, Jr. (pro hac vice)
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
50 South Sixth Street, Suite 1500
Minneapolis, MN 55402-1498
Telephone: (612) 340-2600
Facsimile: (801) 933-7373

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Susie Strohm andDorsey & Whitney LLP
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE STATE OF UTAH
=

SUSIE STROHM and DORSEY &
WHITNEY LLP,

i

i ,

' i

"i-

i

.'

: ; '"iv."

"

'

n -

JUDGMENT
Case No. 080917500

Plaintiffs,

Judge Robert K. Hilder

vs.
CLEARONE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Defendant.

This action came on for hearing before the Court on September 20 and 23, 2010, the
Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding. Having heard the parties' oral arguments, reviewed the
parties' submissions, the pleadings, depositions, and other factual materialfromthe record, the
Court's prior Order-Indemnification (dated 11/19/2009) and Ruling and Order (dated 3/2/2010),
and being fully advised in the premises, on January 24, 2011, the Court entered its Ruling and
Order on plaintiffs' Petition for an Award of Reasonable Attorney's Fee and Costs and the Cross
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Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Fees submitted by defendant ClearOne
Communications, Inc., ("Defendant").
Having in addition determined that there is no just reason for delay, the Court now enters
final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.

Plaintiffs' Petition for An Award of Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Costs is

granted in part, as set forth below;
2.

Judgment is entered in plaintiff Dorsey & Whitney LLP's favor on the Third

Claim for Relief of the First Amended Complaint;
3.

Judgment is entered in plaintiff Susie Strohm's favor on the Seventh Claim for

Relief of the First Amended Complaint;
4.

Plaintiffs are awarded all hours and expenses billed and paid by ClearOne through

and including the invoice that closed on March 31, 2008, with no retrospective adjustment or
reimbursement;
5*

Plaintiffs are awarded and shall recover from defendant ClearOne

Communications, Inc.,
a.

the sum of $972,737.37, as reasonable fees and expenses incurred in

U.SA, v. Frances M Flood and Susie Strohm, 2:07-cr-00485, for the periodfromApril 1,
2008 through and including February 27,2009;
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b.

prejudgment interest on that amount at the contract rate of eighteen

percent (18%), simple interest, in the amount of $362,171.48 through February 1,2011,
together with $479.71 per diem thereafter, until paid;
c.

the sum of $865,490.41, as the compensable reasonable fees and expenses

incurred in this matter, for the period through and including August 10,2010; and
d.

post-judgment interest on that amount at the statutory rate of two point

three percent (2.3 %), in the amount of $54.54 per diem, from the date of this
JUDGMENT, until paid.

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this j ^ d a y of June, 2011.

BY THE COURT:
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